

DAFTAR PUSTAKA

- Abrams, A. B. (2022). *China and America's Tech War from AI to 5G: The Struggle to Shape the Future of World Order*. Lexington Books.
- Anaeto, F. C., Asiabaka, C. C., Ani, A. O., Nnadi, F. N., O., U. F., P., A. I., Anaeto, C. A., & N., I. (2016). The roles of science and technology in national development. *Direct Research Journal of Social Science and Educational Studies (DRJSSES)*, 3(3), 38–43. <https://directresearchpublisher.org/drjseses/files/2016/12/Anaeto-et-al1.pdf>
- Anthony, C., Mely, & Emmers, R. (2006). *Understanding the Dynamics of Securitizing Non-Traditional Security*. Ashgate.
- Arthur, C. (2015). *Xiaomi: It's China's Apple, though you've probably never heard of it*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/16/xiaomi-chinas-equivalent-to-apple>
- Asia Times. (2019). *Taiwan moves to scrutinize Huawei after Android ban*. Asia Times. <https://asiatimes.com/2019/05/taiwan-moves-to-scrutinize-huawei-after-android-ban/>
- Athey, S., & Luca, M. (2019). Why Tech Companies Hire So Many Economists. *Harvard Business Review*, 1–6. <https://hbr.org/2019/02/why-tech-companies-hire-so-many-economists>
- Barry, E., & Kolata, G. (2020). *China's Lavish Funds Lured U.S. Scientists. What Did It Get in Return?* The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/us/chinas-lavish-funds-lured-us-scientists-what-did-it-get-in-return.html>
- Bavisotto, J. (2020). *China's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy Poses a Risk to National Security*. U.S. Department of State. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy-poses-a-risk-to-national-security/>
- Baysal, B. (2020). 20 Years of Securitization. *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations*, 17(67).
- Berman, N., & Andrew, L. M. C. (2023). *Is China's Huawei a Threat to U.S. National Security?* Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/background/chinas-huawei-threat-us-national-security>
- Bloomberg. (2021, May 12). *US agrees to remove Xiaomi from trade blacklist after lawsuit | South China Morning Post*. SCMP. <https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3133172/us-agrees-remove-xiaomi-trade-blacklist-after-lawsuit>
- Bown, C. P., & Hillman, J. A. (2019). *WTO'ing a Resolution to the China Subsidy Problem* (No. 19–17; Working Papers). <https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/wp19-17.pdf>
- Brewster, T. (2020). *Exclusive: Warning Over Chinese Mobile Giant Xiaomi Recording Millions Of People's 'Private' Web And Phone Use*. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2020/04/30/exclusive-warning-over-chinese-mobile-giant-xiaomi-recording-millions-of-peoples-private-web-and-phone-use/?sh=591c51c01b2a>
- Britannica. (2023). *Mass media and social media*. Britannica.

- <https://www.britannica.com/topic/public-opinion/Mass-media-and-social-media>
- Brunner, J. (2021). *Communist Chinese Military Companies and Section 1237: A Primer*. Lawfare Media. <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/communist-chinese-military-companies-and-section-1237-primer>
- Bruton, G. D., & Rubanik, Y. (1997). High technology entrepreneurship in transitional economies: The Russian experience. *The Journal of High Technology Management Research*, 8(2), 213–223. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1047-8310\(97\)90003-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1047-8310(97)90003-1)
- Bureau of Industry and Security. (n.d.). *U.S. Trade with China Overall Trends*. [https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/technology-evaluation/ote-data-portal/country-analysis/2356-2017-statistical-analysis-of-u-s-trade-with-china-pdf/file#:~:text=In 2017%2C 8.4%25 of the,world were imported from China.&text=In 2017%2C U.S. export](https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/technology-evaluation/ote-data-portal/country-analysis/2356-2017-statistical-analysis-of-u-s-trade-with-china-pdf/file#:~:text=In%202017%2C%208.4%25%20of%20the%20world%20were%20imported%20from%20China.&text=In%202017%2C%20U.S.%20export)
- Bureau of Industry and Security. (2018). *U.S. Trade with China*. [https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/technology-evaluation/ote-data-portal/country-analysis/2441-2018-statistical-analysis-of-us-trade-with-china-pdf/file#:~:text=In 2018%2C U.S. exports to,%25 \(%2443.6 billion\) increase](https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/technology-evaluation/ote-data-portal/country-analysis/2441-2018-statistical-analysis-of-us-trade-with-china-pdf/file#:~:text=In%202018%2C%20U.S.%20exports%20to,%25%20(%2443.6%20billion)%20increase)
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. de. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner.
- Campion, A. S. (2020). From CNOOC to Huawei: securitization, the China threat, and critical infrastructure. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 28(1), 47–66. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2020.1741416>
- China Daily. (2014). *Taiwan Clears Xiaomi of Breaching Data Privacy*. China.Org.Cn. http://www.china.org.cn/business/2014-12/31/content_34451874.htm
- Cimpanu, C. (2019). *Vulnerability found in Xiaomi phones' pre-installed security app*. ZDNET. <https://www.zdnet.com/article/vulnerability-found-in-xiaomi-phones-pre-installed-security-app/>
- CNN Indonesia. (2020). *Kronologi Perang Dagang AS-China Selama Kepemimpinan Trump*. Cnnindonesia.Com.
- Columbia District Court. (2021). *United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Memorandum of Opinion)*. Columbia District Court. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0003-0465\(16\)34346-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0003-0465(16)34346-4)
- Congressional Research Service. (2020). “Made in China 2025” Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress. In *Congressional Research Service Reports*. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10964/6>
- Congressional Research Service. (2023). *The International Emergency Economic Powers Act*. Federation of American Scientists. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R45618.pdf>
- Council on Foreign Relations. (2023). *Timeline: U.S.- China Relations*. Cfr.Org. <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations>
- Creemers, R., Dorwart, H., Neville, K., Schaefer, K., Costigan, J., & Webster, G. (2022). Translation: 14th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization. *Stanford Cyber Policy Center*. <https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/translation->

- 14th-five-year-plan-for-national-informatization-dec-2021/#:~:text=The
“14th Five-Year Plan” period is an important,of industri chains%2C promote
the
- Cunningham, E. (2022). *What is the future of China's private sector?* Harvard Kennedy School. <https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/international-relations-security/what-future-chinas-private-sector>
- Deccan Chronicle. (2019). *Xiaomi phones pre-installed security app poses threat to users: Report*. Deccan Chronicle. 12-10-2023
- Defense, U. D. of. (2021). *DOD Releases List of Additional Companies, In Accordance With Section 1237 FY99 NDAA*. <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/14/2002565154/-1/-1/0/DOD-RELEASES-LIST-OF-ADDITIONAL-COMPANIES-IN-ACCORDANCE-WITH-SECTION-1237-OF-FY99-NDAA.PDF>
- Deng, I., & Chen, C. (2020). *5G has been heralded as a tech game changer but consumers in China are underwhelmed by spotty coverage and hard sell*. South China Morning Post (SCMP). <https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3108457/5g-has-been-heralded-tech-game-changer-consumers-china-are>
- Donnelly, D. (2023). *Made in China 2025 – Everything You Need to Know*. Horizons. <https://joinhorizons.com/made-in-china-2025/#:~:text=“Made in China 2025” is,the plan first took root>
- Fierke, K. M. (2015). *Critical Approaches to International Security* (2nd ed.). Polity Press.
- Flannery, R. (2014). *Xiaomi's Lei Jun Is Forbes Asia's 2014 Businessman Of The Year*. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/russellflannery/2014/12/03/the-disruptor/?sh=31472d693948>
- Forbes. (2023). *Lei Jun*. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.com/profile/lei-jun/?sh=8ec2dcd6e64c>
- Global Times. (2023). *China leads the world in integrating 5G into economy: experts*. Globaltimes.Cn. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202306/1292054.shtml#:~:text=Experts noted that China leads,with the most advanced technologies>
- Gold, M. (2014a). *Taiwan government investigates Xiaomi on potential cyber security concerns*. Reuters. <https://jp.reuters.com/article/taiwan-xiaomi-cybersecurity/taiwan-government-investigates-xiaomi-on-potential-cyber-security-concerns-idINKCN0HJ18T20140924>
- Gold, M. (2014b). *Taiwan government investigates Xiaomi on potential cyber security concerns*. Yahoo Finance. <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/taiwan-government-investigates-xiaomi-potential-124233609.html>
- Gold, M. (2014c). *UPDATE 1-Taiwan government investigates Xiaomi on potential cyber security concerns*. Reuters. <https://jp.reuters.com/article/taiwan-xiaomi-cybersecurity/update-1-taiwan-government-investigates-xiaomi-on-potential-cyber-security-concerns-idINL3N0RP39Q20140924>
- Google Finance. (2023). *Xiaomi Corp*. Google. <https://www.google.com/finance/quote/1810:HKG?output=search&sa=X&sq>

- i=2&ved=2ahUKEwiwp6TklpyAAxUtcGwGHYSJBxQQ0pQJegQIDBAB
 Google Translate. (2023). *Xiao Mi Translation*. Google Translate.
<https://translate.google.com/?sl=auto&tl=id&text=米&op=translate>
<https://www.mandarin-names.com/en/name/Xiao+Mi>
- Haour, G., & Zedtwitz, M. von. (2016). *Created in China: How China is Becoming a Global Innovator*. Bloomsbury Publisher.
- House, W. (2021). *The U . S . Economy and the Global Pandemic*.
- Hu, K. (2011). *Huawei Open Letter*. Wall Street Journal.
<https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Huawei20110205.pdf>
- Huang, H., & Jitphrasong, N. (2017). The Analysis of Xiaomi Mobile Phone Marketing Strategy. *International Journal of Management and Commerce Innovations*, 4(2).
- Huawei. (2023a). *Corporate Information*. Huawei.Com.
<https://www.huawei.com/en/corporate-information>
- Huawei. (2023b). *Openness, Collaboration, and Shared Success*. Huawei.Com.
<https://www.huawei.com/en/corporate-information/openness-collaboration-and-shared-success>
- Huld, A., & Interesse, G. (2023). *China's Middle Class – Growth, Policy, and Consumption*. China Briefing. [https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-middle-class-growth-policy-and-consumption/#:~:text=The most common definition currently,%2474%2C221 in 2022\) per year](https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-middle-class-growth-policy-and-consumption/#:~:text=The most common definition currently,%2474%2C221 in 2022) per year)
- India Today. (2014). *Indian Air Force warns against using Xiaomi phones*. India Today. <https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/indian-air-force-warns-against-using-xiaomi-phones-224245-2014-10-22>
- International Legal Technology Association (ILTA). (2019). Keynote Remarks as Prepared for Delivery NCSC Director William Evanina on ILTA Summit 2019. In *Director of National Intelligence*. Director of National Intelligence. https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/news/20190606-NCSC-Remarks-ILTA-Summit_2019.pdf
- Jisi, W., & Ran, H. (2019). From cooperative partnership to strategic competition: a review of China–U.S. relations 2009–2019. *China International Strategy Review*, 1(1), 1–10. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-019-00007-w>
- John-Mariadoss, B. (2018). *Core Principles of International Marketing*. Washington State University. <https://opentext.wsu.edu/cpim/chapter/7-3-licensing/>
- Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (KBBI). (2023). *Arti kata ancam - Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (KBBI) Online*. Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (KBBI) Online. <https://kbbi.web.id/ancam>
- Keane, S. (2021). *Huawei ban timeline: Detained CFO makes deal with US Justice Department*. CNET Networks. <https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy/huawei-ban-timeline-detained-cfo-makes-deal-with-us-justice-department/>
- Kharpal, A. (2021). *Xiaomi shares fall 10% as U.S. adds smartphone-maker to 'blacklist.'* CNBC. <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/15/xiaomi-added-to-us-blacklist-of-chinese-military-companies-.html>
- Klintworth, G. (2001). China, Taiwan and the United States. *Pacifica Review*:

- Peace, Security & Global Change*, 13(1), 41–59.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13239100120036036>
- Kobayashi, S., Baobo, J., & Sano, J. (1999). *MThe “Three Reforms” in China: Progress and Outlook*. Japan Research Institute.
<https://www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/1999/RIMe199904threereforms/>
- Kwan, M. (2022). Regulatory Uncertainty and Business Impact of the Executive Orders Against Investment in Chinese Companies. *The University of Chicago Business Law Review Online*.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4246134
- Lafulla, E. (2020). *Lei Jun explains the meaning of the name Xiaomi and why it is called that*. Xiaomi Today. <https://en.xiaomitoday.it/lei-jun-spiega-il-significato-del-nome-xiaomi-e-perche-si-chiama-cosi.html>
- Lardy, N. R. (2014). *Markets Over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China*. Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Lardy, N. R. (2016). The Changing Role of the Private Sector in China. *Reserve Bank of Australia Annual Conference - 2016*.
<https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/conf/2016/pdf/rba-conference-volume-2016-lardy.pdf>
- Lee, N. T. (2020). Navigating the U.S.-China 5G Competition. *Global China*, April, 1–13.
- Lester, S., & Zhu, H. (2021). Judicial Checks on Abuse of the National Security Rationale: The Case of Xiaomi. *CATO Institute*.
<https://www.cato.org/blog/judicial-checks-abuse-national-security-rationale-case-xiaomi?queryID=b8bbd1dce341080b4f0310a42b6f789e>
- Levine, D. A. (2020). Made in China 2025: China’s Strategy for Becoming a Global High-Tech Superpower and its Implications for the U.S. Economy, National Security, and Free Trade. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 13(3), 1–16.
<https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.3.1833>
- Lewis, D. (2017). China’s Global Internet Ambitions: Finding Roots in ASEAN. *Institute of Chinese Studies*.
<https://www.icsin.org/uploads/2017/07/24/95ef81ecfcb1118bcfbf94b369d0ef1e.pdf>
- Linshi, J. (2014). “China’s Apple” Is Now the World’s Most Valuable Startup. Time. <https://time.com/3648432/xiaomi-valuation/>
- Liu, T., & Woo, W. T. (2018). Understanding the U.S.-China Trade War. *China Economic Journal*, 11(3), 319–340.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/17538963.2018.1516256>
- Mahshun, A. (2022). Pengaruh Kualitas Produk dan Citra Merek Terhadap Niat Beli Smartphone Xiaomi. *Jurnal Ilmu Manajemen*, 10(2).
- Makkaveev, S. (2019). *Vulnerability in Xiaomi Pre-installed Security App*. Research Checkpoint. <https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/vulnerability-in-xiaomi-pre-installed-security-app/>
- McGlinchey, S., Waters, R., & Scheinpflug, C. (2023). *International Relations Theory*. LibreTexts Social Sciences.
[https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book:_International_Relations_Theory_\(McGlinchey_Walters_and_Schei](https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book:_International_Relations_Theory_(McGlinchey_Walters_and_Schei)

- npflug)/00:_Front_Matter/07:_About_the_Book
- McMorrow, R. (2021). *Shares in China's Xiaomi tumble after US investment ban*. Financial Times. <https://www.ft.com/content/8807f7dd-bf76-400c-9bbf-9f713ce5ba57>
- McMorrow, R., & Leahy, J. (2023). *China's billionaires back Xi Jinping's plan to restore economy*. Financial Times. <https://www.ft.com/content/0b5b5560-e125-442c-9af9-6ff7716bb254>
- Mihalcik, C., & Hautala, L. (2020). *Xiaomi, accused of tracking "private" phone use, defends data practices*. CNET Networks. <https://www.cnet.com/tech/mobile/xiaomi-defends-data-practices-after-being-accused-of-tracking-private-phone-use/>
- Murphy, A., & Tucker, H. (2023). *The Global 2000*. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.com/lists/global2000/?sh=3ec3a18d5ac0>
- National Geographic. (2023). *Using Media to Influence Public Opinion*. National Geographic Education. <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/using-media-influence-public-opinion/>
- New Delhi Television. (2014). *Indian Air Force Asks Personnel Not to Use Chinese Xiaomi Phones*. New Delhi Television. <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indian-air-force-asks-personnel-not-to-use-chinese-xiaomi-phones-683720>
- New Delhi Television. (2021). *China Tech Giant Xiaomi Dives 11% After Being Blacklisted By USA*. New Delhi Television Limited. <https://www.ndtv.com/business/china-tech-giant-xiaomi-dives-11-after-being-blacklisted-by-usa-as-trump-administration-ramps-up-its-battle-with-beijing-2352755>
- Pandaily. (2021, August 11). *Xiaomi Chief Lei Jun Releases Annual Speech, "My Dream, My Choice" - Pandaily*. Pandaily. <https://pandaily.com/xiaomi-chief-lei-jun-releases-annual-speech-my-dream-my-choice/>
- Pompeo, M. R. (2020a). *No Protecting U.S. Investors from Financing Communist Chinese Military Companies Title*. U.S. Department of State. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/protecting-u-s-investors-from-financing-communist-chinese-military-companies/>
- Pompeo, M. R. (2020b). *Silicon Valley and National Security*. U.S. Department of State. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/silicon-valley-and-national-security/>
- Powell, A. J. S., Hamilton, M., & Poitras, R. (2020). *US Government Issues Executive Order Prohibiting US Persons from Purchasing Securities of Certain Chinese Companies*. Sanctions News by Baker McKenzie. <https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/us-government-issues-executive-order-prohibiting-us-persons-from-purchasing-securities-of-certain-chinese-companies/>
- Price, R. (2015). *Look how similar red-hot Chinese startup Xiaomi's products are to Apple's designs*. Business Insider. <https://www.businessinsider.com/xiaomi-and-apple-products-side-by-side-iphone-mi-note-copycat-theft-2015-4>
- Process, P. (2021). *Can "China Model" Compete? Evolving State Capitalism and*

- Military-Civil Fusion Strategy Jaehwan Lim Aoyama Gakuin University. 4, 1–32.*
- Qualcomm. (2023). *What is 5G? | Everything You Need to Know | 5G FAQ*. Qualcomm.Com. <https://www.qualcomm.com/5g/what-is-5g>
- Reeves, M., Fæste, L., Chen, C., Carlsson-Szlezak, P., & Whitaker, K. (2020). How Chinese Companies Have Responded to Coronavirus. *Crisis Management*. <https://hbr.org/2020/03/how-chinese-companies-have-responded-to-coronavirus>
- Reuters. (2021). *U.S. will remove Xiaomi from blacklist, reversing jab by Trump*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-defense-department-xiaomi-agree-resolve-litigation-court-filing-2021-05-12/>
- Reuters. (2022, August 11). *Xiaomi CEO says it has 140 vehicles across China testing autonomous driving* | Reuters. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/xiaomi-ceo-says-company-has-140-vehicles-across-china-testing-autonomous-driving-2022-08-11/>
- Reuters. (2023). *China's state planner praises Tencent, Alibaba as attitude towards tech shifts*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/technology/chinas-state-planner-praises-tencent-alibaba-attitude-towards-tech-shifts-2023-07-12/>
- Richter, F. (2020a). *Chart: A Longterm View On U.S. Trade With China*. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/chart/17982/us-trade-in-goods-with-china-since-1985/>
- Richter, F. (2020b). *These are the top 10 manufacturing countries in the world*. World Economic Forum. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/02/countries-manufacturing-trade-exports-economics/>
- Rogers, M. (2012). *Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE*.
- Rogers, M., & Ruppertsberger, D. (2012). Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed By Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and Zte. *Journal of Current Issues in Media & Telecommunications*, 4(2), 59–100. [https://republicans-intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/huawei-zte-investigative-report \(final\).pdf](https://republicans-intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/huawei-zte-investigative-report-final).pdf)
- Rowthorn, R., & Ramaswamy, R. (1997). Deindustrialization– Its Causes and Implications. *International Monetary Funds: Economic Issues*, 10. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues10/index.htm>
- Sacks, D. (2021). *China's Huawei Is Winning the 5G Race. Here's What the United States Should Do To Respond*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-huawei-5g>
- Sagar, P. R. (2014). *Chinese Smartphones a Security Threat, says IAF*. The New Indian Express. <https://www.newindianexpress.com/thesundaystandard/2014/oct/19/Chinese-Smartphones-a-Security-Threat-says-IAF-673334.html>
- Sanger, D. E., & McCabe, D. (2021). *Biden Expands Trump-Era Ban on Investment in Chinese Firms Linked to Military*. New York Times.

- <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/03/us/politics/biden-ban-chinese-firms-trump.html> <https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/economic-sanctions-aml/publications/president-biden-revamps-communist-chinese-military-companies-ccmc-sanctions-program?id=402>
- Sarkar, D. (2014). *Advisory 4 months old, no ban on Xiaomi or other Chinese phones: IAF*. The Indian Express. <https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/technology-others/iaf-issued-advisory-4-months-back-says-no-ban-on-xiaomi-or-other-phones/>
- Sender, H. (2017). *Why Tencent and Alibaba are China's most powerful investors*. Nikkei Asian. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Why-Tencent-and-Alibaba-are-China-s-most-powerful-investors2>
- Shirky, C. (2015). *Little Rice: Smartphones, Xiaomi, and The Chinese Dream*. Columbia Global Reports.
- Sukmadinata, N. S. (2011). *Metode Penelitian Pendidikan*. Remaja Rosdakarya.
- Sutter, K. M. (2020). "Made in China 2025" Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress. *Congressional Research Service*, 28, 2023–2025.
- Tereza Pultarova. (2014). *Taiwan fears Xiaomi smartphones spy on users*. Engineering and Technology (The IET). <https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2014/09/taiwan-fears-xiaomi-smartphones-spy-on-users/>
- The National Congress of the People's Republic of China. (2013). *Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*. The National Congress of the People's Republic of China. <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/c23934/202005/b04ff09d057b4c2d92fca94ca3fc8708.shtml>
- The Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *China (CHN) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners*. Retrieved April 14, 2022, from <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/chn>
- The State Council Information Office the People's Republic of China. (2019). *China honors outstanding builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics*. The State Council Information Office the People's Republic of China. http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/topnews/2019-08/30/content_75154114.htm
- The World Bank. (2023). *The World Bank In China*. Worldbank.Org. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>
- Trihartanto, A., Indrastuti, S., & Nisya, C. (2020). *Keamanan dan Sekuritisasi dalam Hubungan Internasional*. Melvana Media.
- U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2023). *Real Gross Domestic Product*. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A191RL1Q225SBEA>
- U.S. Department of Defense. (2020). *DOD Releases List of Additional Companies, in Accordance with Section 1237 of FY99 NDAA*. U.S. Department of Defense. <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2328894/dod-releases-list-of-additional-companies-in-accordance-with-section-1237-of-fy/>
- U.S. Department of State. (2021). *Communist Chinese Military Companies Listed Under E.O. 13959 Have More Than 1,100 Subsidiaries*. U.S. Department of State. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/communist-chinese-military-companies->

- listed-under-e-o-13959-have-more-than-1100-subidiaries/
- U.S. Secretary of State. (2020). *Military-Civil Fusion and the People's Republic of China*. U.S. Department of State. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/What-is-MCF-One-Pager.pdf>
- United States Congress. (1999). *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999*. United States Government. <https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ261/PLAW-105publ261.pdf>
- Ünlü, İ. (2022). *Why is Xiaomi So Successful?* Xiaomi UI. <https://xiaomiui.net/why-is-xiaomi-so-successful-26185/>
- Wæver, O. (2004). Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'schools' in security theory and their origins between core and periphery. *Montreal: Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*, 8.
- Wertman, O., & Kaurnt, C. (2023). Securitization and the Audience Component: Reconceptualising and Operationalising the Concept. In *Israel: National Security and Securitization*. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25300-3_2
- White House. (2020a). *Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies*. Trump White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-threat-securities-investments-finance-communist-chinese-military-companies/>
- White House. (2020b). *President Donald J. Trump Is Protecting America From China's Efforts To Steal Technology And Intellectual Property*. White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-protecting-america-chinas-efforts-steal-technology-intellectual-property/>
- White House. (2021a). *Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Certain Companies of the People's Republic of China*. White House. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/06/03/executive-order-on-addressing-the-threat-from-securities-investments-that-finance-certain-companies-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/>
- White House. (2021b). *Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Global Emerging Technology Summit*. The White House. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/briefing-room/2021/07/13/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-at-the-national-security-commission-on-artificial-intelligence-global-emerging-technology-summit/>
- Williams, B. (2022). *Xiaomi Corporation v. U.S. Department of Defense: Defending the International Emergency Economic Powers Act*. *Duke Journal of Constitution Law & Public Policy*, 333.
- World Intellectual Property Organization. (2023). *Xiaomi Corporation: Promoting a better life through innovative technology*. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). [https://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id=12271#:~:text=The name of the brand,%2C which means "heart"](https://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id=12271#:~:text=The name of the brand,%2C which means)

- Xiaomi Corporation. (2018). *Xiaomi Annual Report 2018*.
[https://ir.mi.com/financial-information/annual-interim-reports?b1cf09cf_year\[value\]=2018](https://ir.mi.com/financial-information/annual-interim-reports?b1cf09cf_year[value]=2018)
- Xiaomi Corporation. (2019). *Xiaomi Annual Report 2019*.
[https://ir.mi.com/financial-information/annual-interim-reports?b1cf09cf_year\[value\]=2019](https://ir.mi.com/financial-information/annual-interim-reports?b1cf09cf_year[value]=2019)
- Xiaomi Corporation. (2020). *Xiaomi Annual Report 2020*.
[https://ir.mi.com/financial-information/annual-interim-reports?b1cf09cf_year\[value\]=2019](https://ir.mi.com/financial-information/annual-interim-reports?b1cf09cf_year[value]=2019)
- Xiaomi Corporation. (2023). *Xiaomi*. Mi Global. <https://www.mi.com/global/>
- Yang, H., Ma, J., & Chattopadhyay, A. (2021). How Xiaomi Became an Internet-of-Things Powerhouse. *Harvard Business Review* - , *Strategy*.
<https://hbr.org/2021/04/how-xiaomi-became-an-internet-of-things-powerhouse>
- Yoon, S. (2021). *The 3 pillars of China's booming start-up ecosystem*. World Economic Forum. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/06/china-booming-startup-ecosystem/>
- Zhao, L., & Aram, J. D. (1995). Networking and growth of young technology-intensive ventures in China. *Journal of Business Venturing*, *10*(5), 249–370.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/0883-9026\(95\)00039-B](https://doi.org/10.1016/0883-9026(95)00039-B)
- Zhu, D. (2020). *How China's 5G launch will drive the global 5G industry*. Huawei.Com.
<https://www.huawei.com/en/huaweitech/publication/winwin/35/china-5g-launch-will-drive-global-5g-industry>