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*Embracing Global Transformation:
Collaborative Innovations through
Social and Political Research*

7-8th September
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Faculty of Social Science and Political Science
Universitas Diponegoro


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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INDONESIAN SOCIAL & POLITICAL ENQUIRIES
“Embracing Global Transformation: Collaborative Innovations through Social and
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
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The 7th ICISPE International Conference on Indonesian Social and Political Enquiries

"Embracing Global Transformation: Collaborative Innovations through Social and Political
Research
September 7th- 8th 2022


FOREWORD



Research should be a valuable tool for finding solutions to existing problems faced by a country. This belief is reflected to ICISPE 2022 conference. Our world is constantly being challenged by global, massive, and fast changes, starting from the development of the digital era which causes disruption in all aspects of the industry until the world suddenly stops due to the Covid-19 pandemic. But humans continue to show their ability to overcome all these problems by implementing new ideas so that problems can become opportunities. Collaboration in innovation is the key to success in the connected era. We realize that we cannot work alone, we need help from others to achieve the objectives quickly and effectively. Therefore this year's ICISPE is here to accommodate collaborative innovation ideas from various parties to accept the ongoing global transformation.

The 7th ICISPE Proceeding is a summary of the research results presented at the 2022 ICISPE Conference by academics and researchers. This activity was carried out with the cooperation of all committee members at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Diponegoro. Carrying the theme "*Embracing Global Transformation: Collaborative Innovations through Social and Political Research*", this conference was held on 7th-8th September 2022 at the Orange Faculty of Social Sciences Campus.

Over 50 articles were submitted, this year we received some collaborative works of Indonesian authors and some authors from Russia, The Philippines, Germany, Malaysia and China. All were reviewed and refined to meet scientific work standards. We hope that the articles published through this conference will contribute to the improvement and development of society in various social aspects. We would like to thank all the speakers, writers, participants, reviewers, and committee members for their contributions to this conference.



On behalf of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Diponegoro, we would like to thank all speakers, writers, participants, reviewers, and committee members for this conference.

Semarang, 8 September 2022
Dean of Social and Political Sciences Faculty
Universitas Diponegoro


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Table of Contents

Category : Local Government

1. Understanding Disability Policy: Study in Kampar District, Indonesia 2
Steven Antony, Auradian Marta, Baskoro Wicaksono, Iqbal Miftakhul Mujtahid, Musa Thahir
2. Analysis of The "Service Triangle Model" in The Development of User-Oriented Public Services at DPMPTSP Semarang Regency 9
Aufarul Marom, Herbasuki Nurcahyanto
3. Vote Buying: The Practice of Support Mobilization on Head Village Election 18
Dewi Erowati, Puji Astuti, Turtiantoro
4. The Neutrality of Village Heads on The 2020 Simultaneous Local Elections in Demak Regency 24
Nunik Retno Herawati , Fitriyah, Neny Marlina
5. Challenges and Obstacles KPU in The Use Of Erekap in The 2024 General Elections 29
Fitriyah, Nunik Retno Herawati, Ratna Herawati
6. Electronic-Based Local Government System 34
Teguh Yuwono, Dzumuwanus Ghulam Manar, Laila Kholid Alfirdaus
7. Governing Community Based Tourism During Covid19 Pandemic in Central Java 40
Retna Hanani, Amni Zarkasyi Rahman
8. Implementation of Waste Management Policy to Realize Sustainable Development (Case Study: Silopah Program in Semarang Regency) 46
Supratiwi, Yuwanto, Kushandajani
9. Jokowi and Rumors of PKI on Presidential Election 2019 51
Triyono Lukmantoro and Nurul Hasfi



Category : The Economy and People Development Category

10. Dissemination of Information and Community Participation in The Development of Cultural Villages in Sumberwungu Kapenewon Tepus, Gunungkidul Regency 58
Joyo Nur Suryanto Gono; Wiwid Noor Rakhmad
11. Community Empowerment in Mangrove Conservation in The Coastal Area of Kertomulyo Village, Pati Regency, Indonesia 65
Nina Widowati, Hardi Wardono, Kismartini, Irfan Murtadho
12. Kudu Sekolah is an Effort to Improve Community Welfare in Pekalongan Regency 72
Hesti Lestari, Dewi Rostyaningsih, R. Slamet Santoso
13. The Role and Participation of Village Youth in the PKK in Rimpak Village 81
Arif Kurnia Ardi Pradana, Hardi Warsono, Tri Yuniningsih
14. Generation Y on The Spot: Early Assessment of Millennial District Heads' Performance on Human Capital In Indonesian Districts 87
Bangkit A. Wiryawan, Rina Martini, Nur Hidayat Sardini
15. Tracking Down the Place in the Learning of the Everyday Nature 96
June Cahyaningtyas, Wening Udasmoro, Dicky Sofjan
16. Social Capital in The Development of Pancasila Jrahi Tourism Village Pati Regency 104
Wahma Dewi Bintari, Kismartini, Retno Sunu Astuti
17. The Effectiveness of Using Finger Prints in Supporting The Work Discipline of Educators at The Wachid Hasyim I Foundation 111
Dwi Hardaningtyas. Nur Holifah

- 
18. Analysis of Women's Participation in The Local Economy through Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) 117
Novita Maulida Ikmal, Indriasturi, Dwi Hardiningtyas
19. Biased Illustration of Women in Reporting Rape on Online News Portal 123
Wiwid Adiyanto
20. A Review of The Possibility of Gender-based Tidal Flood Mitigation in Indonesia: Pekalongan City as a Case Study 139
Hartuti Purnaweni, Kismartini, Titik Djumiarti, Mohd Hairy Ibrahim, Anis Qomariah
21. Study of Family Communication on Indonesian Films “Ngeri-Ngeri Sedap” 144
Mutia Rahmi Pratiwi, Amida Yusriana, Nuriyatul Lailiyah
- Category : Business and Innovation Revision and Redefinition**
22. Solo City Branding Strategy: As Cultural Tourism City to Attract Tourists 154
Robetmi Jumpakita Pinem, Saryadi, Widayanto
23. Regional Innovation Development Cooperation in Poverty Reduction (Case Study of Poverty Laboratory in Pekalongan Regency) 162
R. Slamet Santoso, Dewi Rostyaningsih, Hesti Lestari
24. Eco-Tourism Development Strategies to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals in Mangrove Park Pekalongan 170
Robetmi Jumpakita Pinem, Widayanto, Bagus Rahmanda
25. Analysis of Muslim-Friendly Tourism Development in Palembang City with ACCESS Model Attribute 176
Tri Yuniningsih, Ida Hayu Dwimawanti
26. The Advantages of Developing Renewable Energy Power Plants in Karimunjawa 185
Hartuti Purnaweni, Titik Djumiarti, Himawan Bagas Wirastomo



Category : International and Global Network for Policy and Cooperation

27. Breaking The Deadlock Formality of The International Convention Become Law	195
<i>Ricca Anggraeni</i>	
28. Enhancing Cultural Diplomacy through Export Creative Commodity : A Case of Nasrafa Brand	204
<i>Rr. Hermi Susiatiningsih, Dewi Setyaningsih, Muhammad Faizal Alfian</i>	
29. Indonesia 2045: Strategy toward a Global Power in The 21st Century	215
<i>Mohamad Rosyidin</i>	
30. Awaken the Dragon: Threat Analysis to China-US Relations over Taiwan	226
<i>Isti Nur Rahmahwati, Muhammad Arief Zulyan, Muhammad Faizal Alfian, Rahmat Syahid Suraya</i>	



Local Government

Jokowi and Rumors of PKI on Presidential Election 2019

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Abstract. As happened in the 2014 political campaign, incumbent candidate Joko Widodo was stigmatized as a supporter of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) or a relative of a PKI member during the 2019 presidential election. Because of these claims, Jokowi—the popular moniker for Jokowi Widodo—has suffered election losses. This political event can be viewed from the viewpoint of moral panic from the perspective of cultural studies. This indicates that the PKI is still perceived as a dangerous force that needs to be destroyed. The PKI is a party that consistently commits crimes, making it a former political organization that still engages in social deviance. In actuality, subsequent investigation revealed that the elite with access to both political and financial power had fabricated the rumors that Jokowi was a PKI member or the son of a PKI member. The goal of these elites is to stop Jokowi from winning reelection as president. On the other side, this rumor has also been exaggerated by the media. The media loudly reinforced Jokowi's exaggerated remark. The PKI will continue to exist in this fashion as a folk devil that needs to be fought.

Keywords: PKI, Moral panics, Presidential election 2019, Cultural studies

1 Introduction

Marx and Engels declared that "a spectre is haunting Europe—the phantom of Communism" [1]. The Communist Manifesto, which was first published in 1848, opened with such assertion. Communist ideology was compared as a ghost by Marx and Engels. Ghosts are often associated with frightful, terrifying forms. Ghosts might also unintentionally trigger fear. A stunning sentence like that, though, has more political value as a warning against growing injustice.

The Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia/PKI), which is strongly associated with everyday discourse, is where the ghost of communism appears in its more recurrent and widely regarded form. The PKI ghost persisted in the context of the 2019 Presidential Election, as if it had been allowed to dominate the discussion. Everything connected to the PKI was either ejected or cursed with condemnation since everyone who was accused of being PKI, whether identified as a member or presumed to be a descendant, may encounter such a dreadful impediment. Because it was regarded as a blasphemous-deserving bastard, the PKI label was genuinely cursed. Because it was regarded as a blasphemous-deserving bastard, the PKI label was genuinely cursed. The PKI was nothing more than an encumbrance that would make a presidential candidate less electable. With all of its stigmas and preconceptions, the PKI was considered one of the forces that may weaken electoral authority.

Joko Widodo is the presidential candidate who has faced accusations of belonging to or descended from the PKI since the 2014 political campaign (Jokowi). During the 2014 Indonesian presidential election, he was associated with PKI, who called him "Jokowi *antheK* PKI" or "Jokowi is PKI's ally. It was aided by many propaganda tools such as graphs, pictures, and so on, and was widely disseminated via social media platforms. Furthermore, Jokowi was once more charged with belonging to the PKI for the period from 23 September 2018 to 13 April 2019 during the presidential election campaign. The presence of a banner bearing the hashtag #JKWBersamaPKI serves as proof of this. In Jakarta, there is a flag that reads, "Jokowi with the PKI." The Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin National Campaign Team (TKN) and the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) both declared the banner to be a black campaign [2]. Jokowi had often said that he was extremely unhappy and angered at being accused of being PKI before the banner even materialized. Jokowi asserts that he has been affiliated with the PKI continuously for a number of years (since 2014). He was so enraged that when Jokowi delivered a speech in front of the crowd, he declared: "I [Jokowi] are looking for the truth," in an effort to give those who had slandered him a "tabok" and a "thump." In reality, Jokowi has requested that the Village Development Officer (Babinsa), a member of the military apparatus, take part in the discussion on this matter. Jokowi cited an internal survey about the 2019 Presidential Election that revealed 6 percent of respondents, or 9 million people, thought he was PKI [3].

In addition to being perceived as trying to preserve his dignity, Jokowi is easily accused of trying to boost his electability when he repeatedly asserts that he is neither the PKI nor its collaborators and issues threats that he will take action against anyone who accuses him of being the PKI. Another annual occurrence is the media's extreme hysteria when reporting on arrests of persons sporting the hammer and sickle symbol and flag-raising ceremonies connected to PKI power, especially in the days leading up to September 30 and October 1. A phenomenon of moral panics is the media's deliberate portrayal of Jokowi and anyone who has excessive PKI fear. The media conducted in-depth interviews with political leaders who shared their concerns about the PKI. Last but not least, the PKI has a legendary value in this nation, both historically and in media reporting.

Early in the 1970s, studies of teenage subcultures and the deviancy theory both developed, and moral panic as a significant phrase or idea in cultural studies was among them. In conclusion, moral panic refers to a social process in which the media culturally identifies a group and characterizes its behavior as causing disruptions and likely to be repeated. These stigmatized deviant organizations are described as modern-day "folk devils" [4]. The PKI and its supporters are the social group in Indonesia that is viewed as abnormal and continuously accused of engaging in subversion. Since communism is viewed as a flawed belief rather than a neutral theory, it is included in this category.

2 Research method

The method employed in this exploratory sort of study is a literature review. The literature review seeks material with critical judgment in this regard. This refers to materials that should be sought for, sources that should be investigated, and topics that should be carefully considered before moving on [5].

3 Results and discussion

Jokowi and PKI Rumor in 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election

To give background on this issue, this article takes one example of the Jokowi PKI rumor (Picture 1). It shows a figure similar with Jokowi – the man with his back to the podium – who was attending a speech by the PKI leader DN Aidit in 1955.



Figure 1. An image used to created rumors about Jokowi is PKI

This image got attention from a large public of Indonesia during the 2019 Indonesian presidential election. The picture was distributed and discussed by netizens, and as it went viral and attracted much attention from mainstream media, particularly online platforms. In an interview with a journalist, Jokowi addressed the rumor and stated that the man in the photograph was not him. Jokowi said that this does not make sense because if you trace it to Jokowi's birth date, then Jokowi was still a child.

In the context of the 2019 presidential election, rumors about Jokowi PKI appeared not only in the mass media but also in real space in the form of banners being put up in public spaces. One of them is a banner posted in Kebok Kacang, Central Jakarta, one of which uses the hashtag #JKWBersamaPKI. From the perspective of online political communication, it was part of mass of mass political mobilization to decreasing Jokowi's voters in the election.

In this study we identify the message as black rumors that strongly relate to a system of values and beliefs associated to social structures and processes that are recognized as truths by particular groups, in this case Indonesian political public.

The Elite Engineering

According to Cohen [6], moral panic was first a state of mind used to draw attention to adolescent culture that might be perceived as socially endangering the status quo. In 1964, there was a conflict between two groups of young people. The Mods are a young group of Vespa-riding individuals. The Rockers are a second group of teenage motorcyclists. The conflict between the two groups of youngsters caused moral panic because of the extensive, exaggerated, and fear-inspiring media coverage. These youth organizations are accused of committing severe societal sins. It's feared that other social groupings may pick up on their impure behavior. Particularly dreaded is the upheaval of societal norms that are thought to have benefited society. Cohen claims that moral panic is currently affecting or will affect society.

According to Cohen [7], "moral panic" is "a condition, episode, person or group of people that appears to be defined as a threat to the values and interests of society; usually presented in a style stylized and stereotyped by the mass media; moral barricades manned by editors, bishops, politicians, and right-minded people; socially recognized experts present their diagnoses and solutions; ways of dealing with problems are developed or (often) forced; the condition then manifests itself in other ways." The idea of moral panic can be applied to elite politics that involve the public in their struggle for power as well as to the lives of young people.

Moral panic does not happen by default. An agenda packed with interests can actually be used to construct and purposefully cause moral fear. Three types of moral panic are put forth by Goode and Ben-Yehuda [8] through the lens of this perspective. The grassroots model comes first. Panic is a typical occurrence in public life in this scenario. The public is deeply concerned. Although it can be incorrect, there is a perception that social ideals are in danger. In order to demonstrate demonstrations of popular worries, certain expressions of worry exist in more structured ways or are more specialized in some areas, such as the media, politicians, political action organizations, and law enforcement. The second hypothesis is the elite-engineered model, according to which the ruling elite "orchestrates" or "generates, produces, manipulates, or causes" moral panic. The most wealthy and influential people deliberately launch numerous initiatives to instill and perpetuate anxiety, fear, and panic among specific segments of the populace. The public at large is not believed to be harmed by the issues addressed. Third is the interest-group theory, which demonstrates how specific interest groups develop moral panic about a particular subject. There may be a surge in public interest in this matter. However, the ruling class is an exception to this.

There are numerous instances where the ruling class has sparked a moral panic. Certain minority groups, such as black youth in England, are blamed for the emergence and spread of different street criminal situations. In actuality, the privileged benefited from the crime [9]. This indicates that a variety of street crimes and other crimes that appear to be a natural part of society are actually the result of elite engineering. To divert attention away from the government's incompetence, these crimes were knowingly tolerated and even purposefully made commonplace. Or, the ruling elites may purposefully incite panic and worry in order to gain widespread support for particular plans or objectives that they have conceived and developed.

In a society where there are risks, moral panic will always exist. This is due to issues with income distribution and wealth production in a more modernized society. The dangers generated by the community are higher in modern societies, and community members are more aware of the risks that will arise [10]. What demands notice is the reason that communism and the PKI have always been associated with the issue of wealth production and distribution. State officials would frequently assert that closing the wealth disparity would prevent communism and the PKI from arising.

Why does the PKI always deserve to be connected to the underprivileged? Actually, terrorism and numerous conservative movements are extremely oppressive, yet one of the causes of these movements is poverty. Why are the PKI and communism as a philosophy constantly blamed for inciting moral outrage? Ideology: What is it? According to Plamenatz [11], ideology initially had the same definition as "sociology" in that it is the study or practice of ideas. In the 18th and 19th centuries, it took place. In later developments, ideology is understood to be a collection of ideas, concepts, and even attitudes that are traits of a specific group or community. Ideology is described by Sargent [12] as "a system of values and beliefs associated to different social structures and processes that are recognized as facts or truths by particular groups of individuals".

Communism is an ideology that is always perceived negatively; it is even employed to incite moral panic. Communism can be understood in a variety of ways, ranging from an idealistic way of life centered on social production and consumption to a totalitarian state run by just one party, the Communist Party. However, "organized and carried out cooperatively" was the original definition of communism. Additionally, communism presupposes the adoption of the Marxist economic system and comprehensive social equality [13]. However, that is not how many presently perceive communism or the PKI. Communism and the PKI are both atheist ideologies that are hostile toward religious people. At its height, communism was only superficially connected to the PKI, which was no longer perceived as a group of individuals who defended the harsh and cruel murder of religious

groups that upheld faith. Jokowi is branded as a PKI leader in such a closed-minded community, which is made worse by his anti-Islamic political stance.

Involvement of the media

Moral panic is greatly influenced by the media. The media's inherent inclination is to seek out specific instances or individuals who are thought to be engaging in social aberrations. In the interest of maintaining social order, the media at that time emphasized the voices of conservative organizations. Cohen [14] lists three roles played by the media in the moral panic in this setting. In the first place, the media exaggerate and misrepresent critical occurrences, such as the quantity of persons involved in a certain incident, the scope of the violence, and its effects. Second, by speaking with certain individuals or a spokesperson for the security forces, the media can foresee an incident. The media will cover everything unrelated to the incident if the forecasts they made are not realized. Third, certain persons are represented in the media by their outward look.

All of these positions demonstrate how, in times of moral panic, the media consistently supports the ruling party. According to a social conflict theory, social divisions based on gender, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class are reflected and even exacerbated by the media. In addition, the media act as spokespersons for the prevailing worldview. In this context, dominant ideology is used to explain ideas and behaviors that support the social, financial, and political objectives of those in authority [15]. The media is expressing the realization of dread, worry, or hysteria experienced by groups in power—even in the setting of moral panic. Particularly when religious justifications are used to scream out the moral terror. Religion is the best tool to combat injustice.

According to Althusser [16], media organizations that are privately owned by a variety of capital owners outside of state institutions have also evolved into Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs). The Repressive State Apparatuses' forces are the army, police, and paramilitary organizations that physically avenge the state's enemies by acts of violence (RSA). These two state institutions provide the state with comfortable assistance. RSA uses coercive methods to safeguard the nation under the guise of security. Through the creation and dissemination of knowledge that upholds the dominant ideology, the ISA defends the state. The state will reject and disqualify everything that they perceive to be in opposition to their official ideals through extensive media coverage. Additionally, the PKI was viewed as the enemy of the entire populace in addition to the state.

The media, however, does not always submit to and obey the authority of the state. Anyone who works in the media is thus positioned as parties who are so easily vanquished and dictated to if the media is merely seen as one of the ideological state apparatuses, separate from schools and religion. It seems as though the media have devolved into helpless messengers who can only stand helplessly in the way of the state's ideology. Another critical viewpoint is that the media be viewed as a public forum with a pluralistic structure. Because the media operate in a liberal democracy, this is possible. In these open venues, the media is the outcome of conflict between numerous forces vying to express widely accepted claims about social existence. The media does not have to be entirely under political elite control. The information presented on the forum is the dynamic creation of the opposing groups, not just a surface-level reflection of ideology [17]. Regarding moral panic, it is feasible that minority groups that have been suppressed and purposefully disguised to speak their ambitions through the media, which is more than simply a tool used to shout the dread of state elites using terror techniques to rule the populace.

Hegemony and counter-discourse

It is impossible to distinguish the methods used by the governing elite to subjugate the opposition from how the moral panic is still protected by them. The moral outrage against the PKI was a result of the state's accomplishment in establishing hegemony. The definition of hegemony according to Gramsci [18] (1971/1992: 57) is "intellectual and moral leadership." This tactic of agreement-based control over the other side avoids using force. Consensus triumphs over opposition. Hegemony and domination are expressly distinguished by Gramsci. The second mastering approach involves the use of physical force by the authorities, such as the use of the military and police.

According to Gramsci, the idea of hegemony is connected to morality. The same rules for carrying out good deeds and abstaining from harmful behavior are found in both morals and ethics in this context. When moral panic strikes, the ethics and way of life that have been so strongly felt face grave risks from a small number of individuals who wish to overthrow the current system. The ruling party uses moral panic as a tactic to subdue its opponents by reintroducing the antiquated morality that has gained widespread acceptance. A moral panic is an effort to drive away outsiders who might undercut one's own principles, which are viewed as being so enormous that they do not need to be contested once more.

The ideas of a battle of movement and a struggle of position were also advanced by Gramsci. Army forces engage in physical aggression and swift movement as part of movement warfare to defeat the opposition. Positional warfare is an effort to spread ideas and raise awareness among a large number of people [19]. The battle of ideas is the first step in persuading the populace to adopt the ideologies of those who are beginning to gain power.

Through the media, educational institutions, and religious institutions, this war is long-term and carried out deliberately. Movement wars, on the other hand, are more transient since they include coercive armed forces. The position battle must be won before the movement war can be successful. Positional warfare includes moral panic since it tries to raise awareness of the opposing side's influence while accusing them of disseminating such damaging immorality.

Because they employ common language, hegemony and positional warfare can function smoothly and appear normal. Foucault's ideas on discourse are important to consider from this angle. Discourse is a sort of language associated with particular institutions, according to Foucault [20]. This category encompasses ideas and expressions that represent a specific institution's ideals. Discourse gives a broad picture of the "language in action" that specific people engage in. The concepts and claims made in the discourse help us to comprehend and "see" the world around us.

Why is the PKI still viewed as dangerous now even though it was the PKI that created communism and was destroyed in such a way in the past? Why is communism, which is said to be unpopular and to cause great suffering, still feared? Only by comprehending the discourse that is still relevant can it be comprehended. It was not just in one institution, like schools, that the PKI and all of its linkages to illegal political groups were discussed. Discourse concerning the PKI and its vile followers have spread across a number of organizations, including social media, family, and religion. The PKI and anyone perceived to be its supporters were both expelled at the same time by these institutions. Under these conditions, it was hardly surprising that moral terror and hysteria reverberated so loudly when the PKI was revisited and the former victims received advocate.

The formation of the regime of truth in our politics is what led to the expulsion of the PKI and even the ban on citizens discussing the PKI or anything related to it. What can be believed and what cannot be believed is governed by the regime of truth. According to Foucault's theories [21], every civilization needs a regime of truth. The discourse patterns that are accepted and serve as the norm represent the regime of truth. The organizations and methods that make it possible to discern between truthful and erroneous assertions make up the regime of truth. False utterances will be subject to punishment under the truth regime. Given Foucault's philosophy, it is clear why the PKI shouldn't be researched. The regime of truth was believed to be opposed to everything having to do with the PKI. Sanctions include not only restrictions but also numerous physical assaults and increasingly aggressive propaganda. It appears that the government of truth cannot be resisted by its presence.

The knowledge that Foucault envisioned is present in the scientific discourse, which is regarded as such. Intervention cannot be separated from the scientific concept, which is also influenced by political factors. The political and scientific aspects will also not be separated. Science and politics, as well as knowledge and power, are inextricably linked. The knowledge that has been suppressed also functions as a counter-discourse. Terdiman proposed the term "counter-discourse" to describe the theory and use of symbolic opposition [22]. In order to combat the "ability of dominant discourses to exclude or absorb those who will become subversive," counter-discourse is a technique that actually brings about change. The phenomena of moral panic can alternatively be explained as the adoption of a counter-discourse to challenge received wisdom. Jokowi, however, does not support the underprivileged in the context of the 2019 Presidential Election. Jokowi is actively promoting the idea that the PKI and everyone associated with it must be thoroughly destroyed. Jokowi does nothing more than uphold the hegemony that the New Order regime has held for years.

4 Conclusion

The PKI controversy in the 2019 presidential election was widely discussed. Once more, Jokowi is connected to the party that was part of the outlawed New Order dictatorship. Jokowi has vehemently disputed this in a number of venues and even promised to retaliate against anyone who continues to see him as the embodiment of the PKI. The strong PKI controversy is actually little more than a moral panic created by political elites, both for and against Jokowi. Jokowi, ironically, took part in the moral panic. This reveals resistance among the elite who are vying for power and is a sign of a moral panic. The moral panic was heavily covered by the media as well. Due to two individuals—Jokowi and PKI—who generate numerous media stories, they can draw a lot of public interest. In numerous stories, the media has criticized the moral panic practiced by the elites, but unavoidably, the media just serves as an echo chamber for the moral panic that Jokowi and other political elites consciously exhibit.

The PKI and everyone affiliated with it had to be destroyed because they were demons of the people who did not deserve to be acknowledged for their human rights. In the end, Jokowi could not escape the hegemony and prevailing discourse that the New Order had established. Jokowi is carrying on this unfortunate tradition in order to be electable and win reelection to the presidency.

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