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BRINGING NAWACITA INTO REALITY: BUILDING INDONESIA FROM THE RURAL AREAS, CIVIL SOCIETY EMPOWERMENT, GENDER MAINSTREAMING, AND THE ROLES OF NGO	265
Nyphadear Tiara, Benedictus Zuriel Hervidiora N and Muhammad Ibnu Nawafil	
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT COORDINATION PROBLEMS (REVIEW OF CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL)	277
Ranggi Ade Febrian	
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY POLICY IN EDUCATION AFFAIRS IN KABUPATEN BANDUNG BARAT (KBB) WEST JAVA	289
Rossy Lambelanova	
UNFINISHED POLITICAL AGENDA: ROLES OF DPD SENATE OF INDONESIA.....	307
Rr. Hermeni Susiatiningsih	
FALLS AND RISES OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA	321
Ahmad Buchari and Hilman Abdul Halim	
BUILDING VILLAGE SELF-RELIANCE ON A BASIS OF ACTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION	331
Ahmad Buchari	
 CHAPTER 5	
ACEH PARTY: ELECTIONS, CONFLICT AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ACEH	343
Sahrudin Lubis and sahrudin	
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE EXPERIENCES IN DEMOCRACY (A LEGAL PLURALISM ANALYSIS)	355
Sukri Tamma, Sakinah Nadir and IsmahTita	
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INDONESIAN POLITICAL THEORY.....	365
Tamrin	
DRAWBACKS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN CITY MAYOR ELECTION: VOTING POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN PEKALONGAN.....	375
Teguh Yuwono	
ENHANCEMENT PARTICIPATION OF SOCIETY TO CONTROL CONTAMINATION AND DAMAGE OF ENVIRONMENT THROUGH GERBANG BOJONEGORO BERSINAR IN BOJONEGORO DISTRICT	385
Yanuar Kartika Sari	
ROOT PROBLEM OF FOREST FIRE AND SOLUTIONS IN COMPLETION (STUDY IN THE RIAU PROVINCE).....	399
Zainal	
SEAWEED DEVELOPMENT IN LABUHAN KURIS VILLAGE SUB DISTRICT LAPE SUMBAWA REGENCY, WEST NUSA TENGGARA PROVINCE.....	409
Bintang Rizki Sakinah and Ruri Hestiti	

Unfinished Political Agenda: Roles of DPD Senate of Indonesia

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Abstract

Roles of *Dewan Perwakilan Daerah* of Republik Indonesia (DPD-RI / National Senate/Regional Representative) is questioned by many stakeholders. DPD-RI is seen as ineffective and inefficient. This senate parliament is also viewed as unable to follow up local local people aspiration. This research is intended to have explanation about how local local people see and behave in connection with DPD-RI of Indonesia. This research uses qualitative research method. Data collection occupies in depth interview and documentation. Interviews are conducted to 15 local people as key informants from across cities or regencies in Central Java Province.

Research results show that local local people are actually still having positive and good expectation to the Senate since there is less trust to DPR-RI (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia /House of Representative/Political Representative) and political parties. Data shows that informants do not trust to DPR-RI or political parties in great deals. Informants believe DPD-RI should be able to fill this empty trust from the local local people. Research results also show that to become elected members of DPD-RI from each province is not an easy jobs. There are many obstacles faced in order to be elected. These obstacles may be related to technical or substantial things. Technical things may be dealt with voting paper, photograph position within voting paper and so forth. Substantial things may relate to local people trust to the candidate, the candidate track record and experience as well as the candidate visionary programs. Interestingly, data results show that DPD-RI is not well known and many local local people are pessimistic about the roles of DPD-RI in achieving the local people hope or expectation. The constitutional position of DPD-RI as stated in National Constitution of Indonesia (UUD 1945) is perceived by the local local people as unfinished political agenda. Local local people see that amend of the UUD 1945 constitution will be the most effective way to empower DPD-RI. If a hope for amend is failed, local local people expect the DPD-RI member to use their political skills to achieve the local people aspiration for public welfare and prosperity.

Keywords: strengthening role of senat, constitution amend, political skills and local people behavior.

INTRODUCTION

The Regional Representative Council (DPD, the Senate of the National Parliament) of Republic of Indonesia is a new institution in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia, as a result of Reformation in 1998. The philosophy of the birth of DPD is to shift the centralized system of government to decentralized, where the Central Government must prioritize the interests of the Region¹ as the basis of formation of the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia, which was marginalized during the era of New Order. Fatwa (2009: 314) formulated the objectives of the establishment of the DPD, are: 1) strenghten regional

¹ Region is the local government and its territorial

ties within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as strengthen national unity throughout the region; 2) improve the aggregation and accommodate aspirations and interests of the regions through the formulation of national policy that is related not only to the country, but also the regions; and 3) encourage the acceleration of democracy, development, and regional progress in a harmonious and balanced way. Thus, DPD become an institution of hope for the Region and its local people, who will carry and represent the interests of the Region with its local people as a whole, unhindered by social, economic, cultural or religious beliefs communities that exist in the region, and other barriers caused by differences of affiliation in a political party.

Until 2015, Indonesia legislative election has been held three times (2004, 2009, and 2014). That is, the DPD has been enough coloring the Parliament. However, until now, the existence and role of the DPD is still questioned by many parties. DPD is seen ineffective and ineffcient, and can not follow up the aspirations of the local local people. The cause of the problem is presumably because of the minimal role of DPD given by the constitution, so that the DPD is in a position of helplessness in carrying out its duties and functions. Kushandayani (2009: 17) stated that, in the beginning of its establishment, the existence of DPD has not been seen because the position of DPD seem to be subordinate of DPR. This constitutional weakness eventually caused a variety of problems, and these problems led to pose a number of regional autonomy problems that is not handled by DPD. The weakness of the constitution related to DPD's role encouraged DPD to take a stand, where the petition for judicial review of the Act MD3 and Act PD3 by DPD to the Constitutional Court on March 27, 2013 were later granted (by Constitutional Court Decision Number 92/PUU-X/2012). However, until now, the execution of Constitutional Court's decision has not been made. Of course, this condition raises questions. But, not to judge the DPD problem is solely the fault of the constitution, it needs to be studied in more depth. Because, the success of the role, duties, and functions of DPD is not only determined by the constitution, but also how the local people and local governments understand, utilize, and encourage the DPD to run their role, duties, and functions. Not less important is the political quality of the local people who got the mandate legitimately through elections to sit as members of DPD side by side with members of the Local people's Representative Council (DPR); as the bicameral system adopted by the Indonesian Parliament.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

Referring to the above background, this research aims to identify the weaknesses of the role of DPD and to find constitutional solutions. The success of the DPD's role is determined by three factors, namely constitutional, the local people and the region, as well as the members of DPD itself. Therefore, this research also aims to identify the view, expectation, and assessment of the local people and the region towards DPD's role as their legitimate representatives. Moreover, this research seek to see how well the capacity of the DPD members carrying out its role. Finally, by examining those three research objects, this research aims to identify the political agenda of the DPD's role has not been resolved in the constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. What is the role of the DPD-RI constitutionally?
2. What are the constraints to become a member of DPD-RI in electoral politics?

3. How do the local people and the local government in Central Java view and expect to DPD-RI?
4. How do the local people and the local government in Central Java view the political quality of DPD-RI from Central Java?
5. What are the obstacles faced by DPD-RI in the fight for the aspirations of the region local people?
6. What are the unfinished political agendas, in the context of the DPD-RI roles, in the Indonesian constitutional?

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Various studies and research on DPD mainly focus on the relationship of DPD and the role given by the constitution. Allegations that DPD considered ineffective, unresponsive, and unrepresentative, is caused by the minimum role or authority given by the constitution. The weakness of the constitutional related to DPD's role is certainly not the sole cause, but there are other factors outside the constitution that affect the success of DPD in carrying out their role. This research seeks to fill the void of previous studies. There are at least three main reasons why the roles of DPD is significant to be studied. Firstly, to see reaffirmation of DPD's role after the judicial review was granted by the Constitutional Court. Secondly, to analyse whether strengthening the role of the DPD solved the problems in the regional as well as its local people. Thirdly, raised the political agenda of DPD that has not been resolved.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research is intended to explain about the DPD from Central Java, related to the constitutional role of DPD; the views, expectations, and assessments of the local local people and Region towards DPD; and the capacity of the DPD members in performing their duties, functions, and role as the representative of the local people and the Region. This research uses qualitative research method. Data collected by using in depth interview and documentation. Data from the documentation was related to the constitutional role of the DPD. In order to refine the data of such documentation and to obtain other data related to the views, expectations, and assessments of the DPD and the capacity of the members of the DPD, researcher did in depth interview with 15 key informants (from most of cities and regencies in Central Java), which represent elements of civil society actors, private actors, and public actors; as in the good governance, those three actors should be presented or involved. Method of informant selection is based on purposive. Basic consideration in purposively selecting informants was based on a concern that an informant knows well the DPD from Central Java, whether the constitutional role of DPD; the view, expectations and assessment of the public towards DPD; and the performance and the capacity of the members of DPD from Central Java.

Methodology of this research is qualitative. Interpretative technique was used to analyze deeply the interviews with the key informants. However, this research does not try to make generalization of the research finding.

RESEARCH SETTING

The philosophy and objective of the birth of DPD in Indonesia is the need for an institution that acts on behalf of local people and region (regional representative), to sit together or side

by side with other representative body (political representative). However, ten years since the DPD exist in the Parliament, there has not been significant outcome. The minimum role given to the DPD by the constitution, allegedly become the main factor that caused the condition. Then, there was a desire to strengthen the role and authority of the DPD, by winning judicial review in the Constitutional Court. This step was considered as a solution to the problem of ineffectiveness role of the DPD. Is that right? In addition to the efforts to provide an academic argument on this question, this research will look for other factors that cause the ineffectiveness role of the DPD, until it ultimately produced an analysis that DPD's role as the representative of the local people and the region is political agenda in the constitution that has not been solved.

The object of this research was DPD in Central Java, since Central Java is one of the national political barometer. Thus, the result of this study would be able to become a foundation in making policies related to regional representative institution in the constitutional of Indonesia.

THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

The problems that have been formulated above would be answered based on two theories. First, the theory of representative democracy system, which will give an idea of how local people, as the owner of sovereignty, determine their political choices toward the leaders. Second, the theory which describes the system and the role of cameral in the parliament.

Representative Democracy System

In this modern era, countries relatively have a large number of population. Thus, the direct involvement of citizens (Athenian democracy) would be difficult and almost certainly impossible to be done. The downside of democracy then encouraged the emergence of new democracy, known as the New Democracy, Modern Democracy, or Representative Democracy, which is characterized by the existence of three institutions of democracy, which could not be separated from one another, namely the election, political parties, and the board of representatives (parliament, legislative).

Parliamentary body is a political representative body, because its members are (a group of) local people chosen freely (through elections), who have the political authority of the local people and hold the interests (which are clearly defined) of the local people. In terms of the relationship between the representative and the local people represented, Hoogerwerf explained that the representative could be classified into five types:²

a) Envoy Type

Representative who act in accordance with the orders of the local people he represents.

b) Representation Type

Representative who has full authority of the local people represented, and he can act on the basis of his own consideration. Thus, his existence does not depend on the local people he represent.

² Hoogerwerf in Syarir Karim, "Fenomena Perwakilan Politik di Indonesia", Sunday 31 October 2010, downloaded on 20 April 2012, at 10.00 am.

c) Politics Type

A combination of envoy and representative, depending on the situation. Representative sometimes have to act as envoy, and sometimes as a guardian.

d) Unity Type

All members of representative institutions is seen as representative of all the local people, regardless of the origin of the political parties that promote them.

e) Classification Type

Members of representative institutions are seen as representatives of certain territorial, social, and political.

Parliamentary institution is a government institution that has legislative power, such as making laws and regulations, as well as monitoring and controlling the executive. In this case, Rob Hague et, et al (in Andi, 2009) stated that "An assembly is a multi member representative body which consider public issues. Its main function is to give assent, on behalf of a political community that extends beyond the executive authority, to binding measures of public policy". As according to Miriam Budiardjo (2012: 322-323), the legislative body has several functions, but there are three most important functions, namely:

1. The legislation function

Determining policy and making laws. To that end, the legislature granted the right of initiative; the right to conduct an amendment to a bill drafted by the government, especially in the areas of the budget.

2. The control function

Controlling the executive, in the sense of keeping all executive action in accordance with the policies that have been established (scrutiny, oversight). To carry this task, the representative body of the local people given the special control rights (such as rights to ask, interpellation, questionnaires and motion).

3. The other function

There are other functions of the representative body of the local people, such as ratifying international treaties made by the executive board; educational function; articulation functions; aggregation function; and political recruitment function.

The functions of the representative are institutionalized in the representative body of the local people. Whereas in the representative body, there are several representation system, namely:

1. Political representative system (which would generate political representatives);

2. Territorial/regional representative system (which would generate regional representatives); and

3. Functional representative system (which would generate functional representatives)

A representative democratic system above, when applied by a country, will determine the shape and structure of institutional representative body of the local people (cameral parliament system).

Cameral Parliament System

Referring to the popular phrase "Power tends to corrupt, but absolute power corrupts absolutely" delivered by Lord Acton in 1887, it is necessary to limit the power of government (Budiardjo, 2012: 107). However, much earlier, the discourse in order the government power is not being misused, was presented by John Locke (1632-1704), with the separation of power, and Montesquieu (1689-1755) with the distribution of power items, namely: the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Theoretically, the separation or division of power to several state agencies is intended to establish a mechanism of checks and balances among the branches of power.

Then, in the context of the presence of internal checks and balances on the institution of parliament itself, countries did power structure in the parliamentary institution, in different ways. This difference spawned several types of chamber system within a parliament, namely 1) Unicameralism Parliament; and 2) Multicameralism Parliament (Bicameralism Parliament, Tricameralism Parliament and Tetracameralism Parliament). In accordance with the needs of this study, it is henceforth only be discussed on Unicameralism and Bicameralism Parliament.

Unicameralism Parliament System is a system where the parliament consists only one chamber. With only one chamber in the parliament, there is no body, space, and other opportunities to offset or control each other. Thus, the chamber has authoritative power, in the role and authority of the legislature. The reason why there is no need for the presence of other chamber is because the member of parliaments have been elected by the local people through direct elections. Therefore, it could be seen that their roles, duties, and functions are as representation of a majority of the popular will. If there is another chamber, then the role and cooperation between chambers would be bias, multi interpretation or overlap, and even there would be possibility of rivalry, since they are elected by, and are representation of the same constituents. The Unicameralism Parliament System is used in almost every country which in the form of unity.

Meanwhile, the Bicameralism Parliament System is a system where the parliament is comprised of two chambers, often described as the lower house and the upper house. Both rooms (can/not) elected directly by the local people, and become a body that represent the people. In this system, there is a division of roles and authority between the two rooms. The Lower House (DPR/House of Representative) which is elected by the local people through elections, is a political representative who has duty and authority greater than the Upper House (Senate) (except in the United States). In addition to its legislative authority and monitoring, the lower house is also authorized to impose the cabinet. As for the Upper House (Regional Representative), elected (direct/indirect) by the local people, with duties and authorities that represent the interests of the regional or territorial he represent.

The emergence of Bicameralism Parliament model was driven by the assessment that if the legislative authority simply structured and centered only in one chamber or one room, then the so-called abuse of power as feared by John Locke, Montesquieu and Lord Acton would have a tendency to happen. Moreover, the interests of the region and its local people to be represented as a whole without any barriers separating them due to differences in the economic, social and political affiliation, as well as the interests of the need for discussion on the decisions / policies taken by parliament, reinforce the need for system bicameral to be implemented in parliament. Generally, Bicameralism Parliament System is applied in federal states.

Apparently, there is a pattern of relationships between the form of state and the cameral parliament system, as showed in the results of the survey in 1986 conducted by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. The results indicated that most countries in the world adhere Unicameral Parliament System, and of those are mostly unitary state. As for federal states, almost all of them apply Bicameralism Parliament System, because there is only one country who adheres Unicameral Parliament System.

In line with the survey above, Andi (2009) later on stated that according to a survey conducted by the International Parliamentary Union, a number of 122 countries in the world which implemet Unicameral Parliament System, mostly are unitary state. While 62 countries that implement Bicameral Parliament System, mostly are federal state.

The complexity in determining which system to be implemented in the country is even harder when a country is still confronted by several variants that exist in the Bicameral parliament System, as presented by Lijphart (1984: 99-101) and Tsebelis and Money (1997: 2). Based on the difference in strength between the two chambers in a parliament, the experts formulated two forms of Bicameral Parliament System. First, the Weak Form of Bicameralism Parliament System. In this system, each of the chambers does not have equal authority. One of the chambers is superior than the other. Secondly, Strong Form of Bicameralism Parliament System. In this form of system, each of the chambers in the parliament has equal authority. Then, Giovanni (in Denny Indrayana, 2008: 300) expand the categorizations or variants of Bicameral Parliament System into three types, namely:

1. Soft Bicameral Parliament System

This type of system is also known as the Asymmetric Bicameralism Parliament System, due to the asymmetrical or unequal power possessed by each of the chambers or rooms in the Parliament. The power of one of the chambers is far more dominant over the other. Therefore, it is sometimes also referred to the Weak Bicameralism Parliament System.

2. Strong Bicameral Parliament System

It is a Bicameral Parliament System with almost equal power sharing, or symmetric. Therefore, it is often referred to as a Symmetris Bicameral Parliament System.

3. Perfect Bicameral Parliament System

This type states that if the power possessed by each of the two chambers or rooms in the Parliament are the same, or truly balanced, therefore it is called the Perfect Bicameral Parliament System.

In addition to the various types of the cameral parliament system, as mentioned above, a country in determining cameral parliament would also be influenced by many other things. In this case, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (<http://www.ndi.org>) stated that "Although historical, cultural and ultimately political factors specific to a particular country will influence this decision, the experience of other countries provides a useful basis on which to determine whether a bicameral or unicameral model better serves the current needs and future goals of that country". Thus, cameral selection is not an easy task, and the state must take part in determining the system. On the contrary, if the debate in determining the form of cameral in the parliament is greater than the implementation of duty as representatives of constituencies and regions, then the condition is referred to as an

unfinished political agenda, because the Parliament has not been able to act as the representative body of the local people.

FINDINGS AND ARGUMENT

In accordance with the problem statements above, the findings and arguments are as followed:

The Role of DPD RI Constitutionally

The 1998 Reformation led the birth of Regional Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*, or DPD), making the Parliament system in Indonesia bicameral since then; consisting of DPD and the Local people's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, or DPR). The emergence of DPD was to meet the demands of the Region, so that the interests of the local people and the Region is represented exclusively in the other chamber in the national parliament that are non-political representative (DPR), which is through the institution which serves as a regional representative (DPD). The rest, was in order to bring the system of checks and balances, so that there is no tyranny in parliament. However, in the course which already take a relatively long time (2004 - 2015), DPD have not meet the expectations of the local people and the Regions. The existence of this Council, referred to Asshiddiqie (2012: 32), is "the presence of DPD ... just as 'supplements', 'frills', which does not really matter).

Constitutionally, the role and authority of DPD is subordinate to DPR,³ because DPD is only authorized to propose, discuss (and give consideration), and to supervise specific Bill (ie as far as it is for the interests of Regions).⁴ Thus, DPD is often referred to as a consultative

³ Jimly Asshiddiqie (2002:32) stated that "In essence, the legislative branch, is in the hands of DPR. However, as far as it is for the interests of the Region, such as those associated with the matters referred to in this paragraph, the DPD is given the right of initiative to propose a bill. " This article has implications for the size of the authority and role of DPD in the legislative process (Simabura, 2011: 142).

⁴ Chapter VII A, Article 22D (http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---d_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legal_document/wcms_174556.pdf):

- (1) The DPD may propose to the DPR Bills related to regional autonomy, the relationship of central and local government, formation, expansion and merger of regions, management of natural resources and other economic resources, and Bills related to the financial balance between the centre and the regions.
- (2) The DPD shall participate in the discussion of Bills related to regional autonomy; the relationship of central and local government; formation, expansion, and merger of regions; management of natural resources and other economic resources, and financial balance between the centre and the regions; and shall provide consideration to the DPR over Bills on the State Budget and on Bills related to taxation, education, or religion.
- (3) The DPD may oversee the implementation of laws concerning regional autonomy, the formation, expansion and merger of regions, the relationship of central and local government, management of natural resources and other economic resources, implementation of the State Budget, taxation, education, or religion and shall in addition submit the result of such oversight to the DPR in the form of materials for its further consideration.

body, with a very weak legislative function, even too soft cameral (outside the bicameral nature of the two types defined by Lijphart (1984, 99-101), Tsebelis and Money (1997, 2), which are strong cameral and soft cameral). When observing the political legitimacy of DPD, DPD basically has the same power with the DPR, whose members are directly elected by the local people through the Legislative General Election. However, the role and political authority (legislation) set out by the constitution, are very limited and weak. This condition often makes DPD referred to as "barren", "between there and not", "institution accessories" and so forth.

Based on the Constitution (UUD 1945) it could be concluded that the roles and authorities of DPD in the Indonesian Parliament are actually:

1. Disrupted local people's sovereignty, because the members of DPD who have strong legitimacy as the executor of the local people's sovereignty, could not carry out its function in the system of representative democracy, in the democratic paradigm-desentralistic.
2. The system of checks and balances between organs in the Parliament does not work, while that function was the main consideration why DPD was formed.

Apparently, the problems are not only constitutionally. There is a desire from other chamber (DPR) to deliberately emasculate the roles and authorities of DPD, and does not support the implementation of territorial representative functions as mentioned in the three products of legislative parliament, namely: Law 27/2009 on Local people's Consultative Assembly, Local people's Representative Council, Regional Representative Council, and Regional Local people's Representative Assembly; Law 12/2011 on Establishment of Laws and Regulations; and Law 17/2014 on Local people's Consultative Assembly, Local people's Representative Council, Regional Representative Council, and Regional Local people's Representative Assembly (UUMD3). DPD did test resistance to the Constitutional Court (MK), through formal petition and judicial review for those three laws. Through the Constitutional Court Decision No. 92 / PUU-X / 2012 and No. 79 / PUU-XII / 2014, the three laws that have reduced the functions, duties, and authority of DPD (defined and required by the 1945 Constitution), were declared unconstitutional and must be positioned properly in accordance with the 1945 Constitution.

It does not stop there. In order to strengthen the role and authority of DPD, this council take the step further, by applying for amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The question is, whether the issue of strengthening the role and authority of this Council is enough through the 1945 amendments (only). The Constitution is an important and major issue, but DPD is not limited to constitutional issue, and rather, an empirical level. The issue would be related to the political behavior of the local people and the Regions, as well as the quality of the DPD members, which becomes important in determining the success of the function of regional / territorial representative in a democratic system-decentralized, as well as the function of checks and balances among institutions or organs in the Parliament.

The Constraints to Become a Member of DPD in Electoral Politics

Neither DPD nor DPR are elected directly by the local people simultaneously, through legislative elections every five year period, although the purpose of the election is different. If the DPR is a representative selection of the population, then the DPD is to represent the Region. The other difference is, if the membership of DPR came from or through the organization of a political party, membership of DPD are individuals. From these differences, the level of competition and the difficulty to become DPD members are greater than the members of DPR. Research shows that the high degree of difficulty may be due to a strong obstacles that refer to two playing handicaps items, those are:

1. Substantial Problems

- a) The DPD candidates does not have a political machine that is well-organized, have the experience and spread nationally as the DPR;
- b) The electoral district for candidates of the DPD is as wide as an area of province. This is in contrast with the prospective members of the DPR, where one province can have multiple electoral districts, defined based on the population of the province.
- c) Huge cost, time, and great power, are the implications of the absence of a political machine and breadth of the constituency, as mentioned above.

2. Technical Problems

Technical problems are the problems associated with DPD election techniques, such as the size of the ballot paper; quality, setting and positioning the photograph of the candidate; and the absence of officers deployed at each polling station and placed throughout the province (with the task of monitoring / escorting the votes of candidates), as done and provided the political party on the candidate. In this case, the field data indicates that the technical factor is a blessing which is helpful for floating voters, confused voters, or voters who do not have sufficient knowledge of candidates competing. Finally, the condition is also a blessing for DPD member candidates who have a favorable technical factors. On the contrary, favorable technical factors were only obtained by several candidates only, and technical factors will complicate other candidates that technically disadvantage.⁵

Theoretically, how the political behavior of voters based on the technical setting, quality and positioning "figure" influence and determine the election of a person, has not yet much been discussed in voting behavior, whether in the psychological perspective, the perspective of rational choice and sociological perspective. It has the potential to become a new political behavior of voters, since the technical aspects precisely determine the election of a person.

⁵ Denty victory in legislative elections in 2014, with the acquisition of a fantastic vote (1,900,767), far exceeding other members of DPD Central Java Province, namely Bambang Sadono (1,224,837), Muqowam (1,235,476) and Sulisty (948 449), was due to setting, picture quality, and positioning of the ballot card. In a matter of rational, three of them should be able to obtain vote exceeds Denty, because they had both an engine and a political experience (Bambang Sadono and Muqowam has a background as a political party official, and has held members of Parliament), while Sulisty as chairman of the Indonesian Teachers Association for Central Java (so it could be said that he has mass loyalty teacher group which is quite large). Meanwhile, Denty is only as a housewife. So, the victory of Denty, Bambang, and Muqowam was because of the setting, quality, and mainly because of their favorable positioning photograph (located in the middle row, which could be seen easily and quickly well-marked by the voter).

View and Expectation of Local People and Local Government in Central Java to DPD-RI

One of the important and major results of Reforms are shifting of centralization system to democracy-desentralistic system that more emphasis on the real interests of the local people and the Regions, give rise to a positive outlook and big expectations of the local people and Region to the DPD- RI, because the institution is expected to present a system of checks and balances among institutions in the Indonesian parliament. By two rooms, the parliament is not only controlled by the political power of the political parties, but also will be controlled by the other room which is a representation of the local people and Region that increasingly broad and deep to the diversity of each region, both in the field of culture, customs, social, economic and human and natural resources.

The research data showed that the local people and Region have great expectations to the DPD so that the interests of them can more be met through taking a political role and aspirational actions of DPD in the determining of national policies which favor of the local people and Region interests. Its great hopes that DPD can overcome the problems and promote local people and Region is fueled by the fact that is faced by them, namely: they have lost confidence to the political parties (following the institution be born, namely DPR parlemen). The political parties and House of Representatives has not produced results, full of political intrigue and conflict, are less able to realize his campaign promises, busy and requires / approached people only when having a large working, namely the general election.

Views of Local people and Local Government to Quality Members of DPD-RI of Central Java

Central Java Province as a big province and become one barometer of the level and condition of people and Region in national. Local people and Region have positive view and big expectation to DPD.

However, in fact, the view and expectations of the local people and Region to the DPD RI from Central Java Province this proved to be only limited imagination or thoughts, because the reality on the ground shows that they have not been able to play a political role as representative of the local people and Region. Especially by local governments, members of the Province of Central Java DPR are saw and considered still are there and better rather than the DPD RI from Central Java Province role and performance. This assessment is based on the fact that when the members of the House of Representatives of Central Java Province down to his electoral district (recess), they will contact, sit up and take to the pitch along with local governments to look for and try to resolve the problems of the local people and the Region. These things are not or less done by the members of DPD RI from Central Java Province. Of course there is a causal factor for their views of the role of the DPD RI from Central Java province.

The research data related the views of local people and Regions toward the quality of political members of DPD RI from Central Java to mention that there is a recognition that in comparison with the DPD previous period, DPD from Central Java province, 2014 - 2019 period, has a quality background of political "good enough". All members of DPD RI period 2014-2019 have been sitting as a member of parliament (2 person ex member of DPD, namely Denty and Sulisty and 2 person of former members of the House of

Representatives, namely Bambang and Muqowam). But apparently in the implementation of their role and function as representative of the people and its Regions, is still considered "far from the fire" (what happened is still far from expectation). Of course there are the causes factor for this condition, in addition to constitutional factors as mentioned above, also due there are their mental and capacity quality factors in the assume role and function as representatives of the people.

The research data revealed that the local people and Region did not receive or felt the political role and representation functions that has been run by the DPD-RI of Central Java Province. They pointed out the problems in Temanggung that a quite crucial and had becoming the talk and influence on national tobacco tax public policy-making. Assessed crucial because the demo had been done by Temanggung tobacco farmers to the Central Government related the establishment of the tobacco excise tax policy that does not favor them. For Temanggung tobacco farmers, tobacco is synonymous with Temanggung and tobacco is a culture of Temanggung agriculture until they say life and death with tobacco. That big problem and there is in front of the eye, but it is not or has not been touched by the DPD that has become representative of the people in these two periods running. So, what about other issues? A similar case also occurred related to the problems of regional expansion (Regency of Banyumas, Cilacap and Brebes), Block Oil Cepu, Cement pabrik at Sukolilo District of Pati Regency, Steam Power (power plant) in Batang Regency, and others, which is where this problem requires the role and authority of DPD, as the constitution assigned him, but they did not do. It occurs naturally concerns the quality of mental and political capacity of them.

The opinion of the capacity of members of DPD RI from Central Java is that the DPD members do not have the capacity in the battle to defend the local people or regions. Regions cases mentioned above, almost never become their agenda, either to discuss with the local people and Region, moreover carry and fight to the Center. DPD members have many various backgrounds and abilities, but less political skills, so that they are then not able to powerfully bargain in the national political context. Local people and Regional feel that the political skills and capacity of the DPD is low.

Low political capacity can be attributed with the low political mental anyway, because there is abuse of power against the sovereignty of the people that delegated to DPD, namely the arrogance and self interest utility maximalization. Results indept interviews to some bureaucrat Regional conclude that DPD members had never established a working relationship with the Region, while the Region is seen as better prepared, better know and understand more about the people and the region as they have accurate data of the tools of government that they have up of the bottom level of the community organizational closest to the people, namely the neighborhood organization (RT, Rukun Tetangga). On the other hand, the DPD members have an more interest and direct of the local people (instead of the Regions). Closeness to the local people they intertwine and maintained solely for the sake of imaging, and in an effort to maintain and increase the number of votes to win the next legislative elections. This not only injure the constitution, but it can be regarded as immoral political behavior, because they put forward the self-interest above the name of the implementation of the people's sovereignty. ⁶Of course this is also related to the conditions

⁶ Interview with WK, SD, BT and PT on August 10, 2015 at 15:00

of the local people who could be categorized as not "politics literate " and indifference to the new institution DPD, so basis for selecting members of the DPD is not because of the capacity and quality that have DPD members own, but by other factors, such as technical factors sound card, family , network and successful team (Hermini, 2014).

Abilities, skills and political behavior that is not qualified DPD is supported also by the control system and accountability on the role, duties, functions and authority of the DPD which are not regulated institutionally. To whom and to what kind of system, they are accountabilities of the role and authority mandated by the constitution?

Obstacles Faced by DPD in Fight for Aspirations of Local People and Region

In the fight for the aspirations of the local people and the Regions, DPD has obstacles. The research data identified the three obstacles, namely:

1. Constitutional Obstacles

The role and authority of DPD constitutionally weak, where the constitution put DPD position to the second class, which means between DPD and the DPR is unequal. The Constitution states that DPD limited authority only: to propose, discuss, consider and oversee against specific legislation. Within the limitations of the role and authority, DPD to become an institution that is not only weak but also helpless in the face of the DPR that strong constitutionally.

2. Obstacles of political skill and capacity

Assorted background that owned by DPD is positive, but if it is not followed with the capacity and political skills, would be futile. Even the capacity and political skills DPD assessed as "low", because although there are political experience had been a member of parliament, but the facts say that they have not played the role of representation of the people and the Regions, as expected. They even underestimated by DPR. The example of this case as SDH mentioned that often the work of DPD "thrown in the wastebasket", or recognized as work and are used for making policies by DPR.⁷ This case showed (as mentioned by some informants) that DPD members are not capable in terms of lobbying and political bargain to DPR

3. Obstacles of motivational factors becomes DPD

This is correlated to the political motivation of DPD members. Research results found that not all DPD members' motivation is strengthening institutional capacity of DPD power. Some DPD members prefer to safe their own political interests by sustaining for their votes for next election. Motivation or commitment to DPD as institution empowerment is weak since political self interests are very dominant. This self interest dominations make many efforts to strengthen the DPD institutions face many challenges.

Unfinished Political Agendas, in The Context of The DPD Roles, in The Indonesian Constitutional

⁷ SDH statement in a Seminar ar Faculty of Social and Poitical Sciences-Diponegoro University, 2012

It is then finally concluded that political reform in order to strengthen the political role and position of DPD in Indonesian political system and state constitution is unfinished yet. The initial agenda to clearly make strong bicameral system is faced many strong challenges. These challenges are not only related to constitutional system (which is needed by amendment) but also many political skills needed by the DPD members. The idealism to improve the roles of DPD to defend local people from different local regions across Indonesia is still questionable.

DPD is then becoming second class parliament since it does not clear and real authority to follow up local people aspirations. The hope of checks and balances power between DPR and DPD is not taking place yet since DPD is really weak and less authority than DPR. In the other hand, local people is not smart selection to choice of member' DPD, the condition is caused by local people is very minimal of level of political literacy, awareness and concern of the people to the DPD new institution (Hermini, 2014).

It is a need to empower and improve DPD authorities by asking the people to force DPR in this power sharing. DPD must be seen as important power of local people to safe their local people in the context of national interests. This method of empowerment should be managed in good and democratic ways, not by political chaos and instabilities.

Method of DPD empowerment is still important to force. This method is not only referring to constitution mechanism through UUD 1945 amendment, but also by improving DPD members political skills. In fact, the political skills of DPD is limited since they are not sensitive, unaware and not accountable for local people who elected them. They are not sensitive to local people concerns and problems.

The final agenda of DPD empowerment that are unfinished is referring to absences of ideal type of institutional framework and relations between state institutions, especially DPD, DPR and President. This is important since imbalance power of DPD and DPR may be resulted in local people disappointment to their representative institution, particularly DPD RI. Regional accountability is important to sustain local people and local government expectations.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Referring to above explanation, the basic conclusion of the research can be concluded that there are still unfinished agendas related to the role of DPD (National Senate of Indonesia). DPD which is born in the era of reformation after the New Order "Soeharto" regime collapse. Regulations and authority division on the UUD 1945 constitution regarding to national institutions, especially in relation to DPD, DPR and MPR is not ideal yet. Although local government or provinces in Indonesia is not as strong as states in the United State political system, it is important to argue that the role of DPD as regional representatives in Indonesian national politics context is pivotal.

Demands for DPD enforcement may be high since DPD can be hoped as an alternative channel to follow public aspiration up, as a consequence of political distrust to DPR especially. DPD is then seen as a new hope for regional local people or local local people to sustain their needs or interests.

Interestingly, many local people believe that DPD is still hoped to assist local local people to fight for their interests in the national level of Indonesia. In doing so, the ideal way out may be related to constitution amendment. However, if constitution amendment is difficult to

happen since it is very political, DPD members must have political skills to deal with these all weaknesses. These political skills refer to several capacities, such as lobbying, coordinating, communicating and making good networking to strong political powers or strong political individuals in the national politics.

Furthermore, the conclusions may be taken from this research are as follows:

1. Roles of DPD RI in the context of national state system is weak and less power. This is due to limited authorities provided by the national constitution of Indonesia (UUD 1945 constitution). This role is not a ideal system of power distribution in the state.
2. There are strong obstacles in political competition to be elected as a member of DPD RI. Degree of competition and difficulties for DPD member to be elected is much more difficult than a member of DPR.
3. These obstacles refer to two main handicaps, namely technical and substantial problems. Technical problems may refer to technical election one, such as ballot paper, photograph position in the voting paper and so the like. Substantial problems may be related to big cover of provincial area, and large amount of resources in order to be elected.
4. Local people expectation to the role of DPD RI is really high. Local people and Regional want a member of DPD to take significance political roles or actions in order to defend local people interests and needs. This is because of the fact that there has been political distrust to other parliament body, namely DPR RI.
5. However, local people opinions toward the capacity of DPD members is that DPD members do not have capacity yet in fighting for defend local local people or province. Members of DPD RI have many various backgrounds and capabilities so they are then not able to powerfully bargain in the national political context. Local local people perceives that political skills or capacities of DPD members are low.
6. There are many obstacles faced by DPD RI in defending local local people interests or needs. These obstacles refer not only to limitation of their political skills, but also related to their motivation for becoming a member of senate DPD. Motivation of having job is often blamed as the real obstacle for DPD member to actively fight for local local people needs and interests.
7. Finally, unfinished political agendas of role or position of DPD RI in the national political context still take place. Current constitutional positions of DPD reflects the fact DPD is "second class" parliament in Indonesia after DPR RI. DPD does not have real power or authority to implement their missions.

In order to continue this agenda for DPD empowerment and positioning DPD RI in the ideal type of state institution, the following recommendations are important to be followed up.

1. Political attempts to empower DPD RI is still needed to continue by sustaining political supports from other strong political body, especially DPR and strong leaders of the political parties. Political connections and networking to these powerful actors are pivotal to fight for having sufficient authority from the constitution.
2. There should be constructive attempts to decrease the heavy requirements to be a member of DPD, since this requirement is much more difficult to fulfill rather than to

become a member of DPR. Equal political treatment should be conducted and provided. DPD is often called a political accessory only.

3. Quality of election process especially related to the requirement process and preparing for election tools should be managed professionally in the basis of political equality and justice. KPU should provide mechanism to make sure that all process of political contestation is managed and proceed well.
4. Strong political education for local local people is needed in order to make sure that they elect a right person for DPD member. Wrong political choice may be resulted in unqualified member of DPD as shown today. Intensive political education may be required to guarantee the effectiveness of this political learning.
5. Although members of DPD come from many different backgrounds, it is important for local local people or voters to make sure that they elect someone who has plenty experience in fighting or following local local people aspiration up. Knowing the detailed track records of the candidate for DPD election competition is important to have more credible members of DPD RI.
6. Improving political skills of DPD members are very significant to guarantee the fulfillment of local local people interests and needs. These political skills may be learned from formal or informal processes, especially in capacity to make political network, bargain and communication.
7. Finally, next continuous agenda for reorganizing DPD and other national institutions is still required in order to defend and follow local local people aspiration needs and interests. In doing so, many efforts both formally or informally, locally or nationally to improve regional representativeness.

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