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*Embracing Global Transformation:
Collaborative Innovations through
Social and Political Research*

7-8th September
2022



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Faculty of Social Science and Political Science
Universitas Diponegoro


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PROCEEDINGS The 7th ICISPE
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“Embracing Global Transformation: Collaborative Innovations through Social and
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
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


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The 7th ICISPE International Conference on Indonesian Social and Political Enquiries

"Embracing Global Transformation: Collaborative Innovations through Social and Political
Research
September 7th- 8th 2022


FOREWORD



Research should be a valuable tool for finding solutions to existing problems faced by a country. This belief is reflected to ICISPE 2022 conference. Our world is constantly being challenged by global, massive, and fast changes, starting from the development of the digital era which causes disruption in all aspects of the industry until the world suddenly stops due to the Covid-19 pandemic. But humans continue to show their ability to overcome all these problems by implementing new ideas so that problems can become opportunities. Collaboration in innovation is the key to success in the connected era. We realize that we cannot work alone, we need help from others to achieve the objectives quickly and effectively. Therefore this year's ICISPE is here to accommodate collaborative innovation ideas from various parties to accept the ongoing global transformation.

The 7th ICISPE Proceeding is a summary of the research results presented at the 2022 ICISPE Conference by academics and researchers. This activity was carried out with the cooperation of all committee members at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Diponegoro. Carrying the theme "*Embracing Global Transformation: Collaborative Innovations through Social and Political Research*", this conference was held on 7th-8th September 2022 at the Orange Faculty of Social Sciences Campus.

Over 50 articles were submitted, this year we received some collaborative works of Indonesian authors and some authors from Russia, The Philippines, Germany, Malaysia and China. All were reviewed and refined to meet scientific work standards. We hope that the articles published through this conference will contribute to the improvement and development of society in various social aspects. We would like to thank all the speakers, writers, participants, reviewers, and committee members for their contributions to this conference.



On behalf of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Diponegoro, we would like to thank all speakers, writers, participants, reviewers, and committee members for this conference.

Semarang, 8 September 2022
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



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
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International and Global Network for Policy and Cooperation

Indonesia 2045: Strategy toward a Global Power in the 21st Century

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Abstract. Although the literature on the rising power phenomenon has been widely studied, Indonesia is rarely used as a case study. There have not been literature that explicitly discuss Indonesia's strategy to become a 21st century global power. Existing literature on Indonesia's foreign policy are merely descriptive. This paper aims to analyze Indonesia's strategy to become an influential global power in the international politics in 2045. Using the concept of middle power diplomacy, this paper argues that Indonesia's strategy to become an influential global power in international politics in 2045 can be pursued by increasing the role of leadership or "middle powermanship." This role demands a strong commitment to multilateralism and the resolution of global problems. This commitment will improve Indonesia's international reputation so that in turn it will create a "manager of crisis" label that can enhance international trust to Indonesia. If balanced with economic and military power, this middle power diplomacy can become a "bridge" for Indonesia to achieve status as a major power.

Keywords: Global power in the 21st century; Indonesia; Middle power diplomacy; Multilateralism; International reputation

1 Introduction

In his inauguration speech for a second term in 2019, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) stated that Indonesia aspires to become a developed country by 2045. According to Jokowi, at the 100th year of independence, Indonesia's per capita income is estimated at Rp. 320 million or Rp. 27 million per month. Indonesia's GDP is estimated to reach US\$ 7 trillion [16]. This optimism seems quite realistic since world-class research institutions projected that Indonesia will become one of the world's major economic powers. Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC) is one of the international institutions that is optimistic about the prospect of Indonesia becoming a world economic power. In its 2017 report, PwC projects that Indonesia will be ranked fifth in the world in 2030 and fourth in 2050 after China, India and the US with a GDP of US\$ 10 trillion [26].

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From the military side, Indonesia in 2021 will be in the 15th rank of the largest military power in the world [11]. This position makes Indonesia the country with the largest military power in ASEAN. However, in terms of the amount of defense budget, Indonesia is still below Singapore. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Indonesia's defense budget is US\$ 9,396 billion, while Singapore has a defense budget of US\$ 10,856 billion [33]. In 2022, Indonesia's total defense budget will increase by 13.28% to Rp. 133.9 trillion. The largest allocation of the budget will be used to purchase weapons in the TNI, non-defense equipment modernization program, and defense infrastructure [10]. The priority for the allocation of defense equipment spending is in line with the commitment of the Minister of Defense, Prabowo Subianto, who wants to modernize various TNI defense equipment. Prabowo said that so far the allocation of the defense budget has been mostly used to improve the welfare of personnel so that the rejuvenation of the defense equipment system has been

hampered. Therefore, Prabowo said the modernization of the TNI's defense equipment system was very urgent [4]. The ambitious plan is concretely demonstrated by the Indonesian Air Force, which recently confirmed that it will buy French-made Dassault Rafale fighter planes and US-made F-15 EX to form three squadrons or more than 30 fighter aircraft [2]. If the plan is actually realized, it is certain that Indonesia's air power will become the strongest in the region.

The economic and military dimensions are clearly not the only elements that determine the strength or weakness of a country's influence on the international stage. The classical realist Hans Morgenthau in his classic work *Politics Among Nations* stated that there are nine elements of national power that determine whether a country is influential in the international environment or not. Of the nine elements, five elements are included in the tangible elements, namely geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, and demography. While the other four elements are intangible, namely national morals, diplomacy quality, and government quality [19]. In the 2000s, RAND Corporation research institute developed an analytical framework to measure national strength by combining three elements, namely national resources, national performance, and military capability [37]. In fact, the superiority of a country is no longer measured by the country's ability to force other countries to follow its wishes (hard power) but how a country is able to co-opt the minds and hearts (soft power) of the people of other countries so that instead of creating fear and reluctance, power creates attractiveness [22].

So far, conventional wisdom in Indonesia tends to see national strength results solely from economic and military power. It is still rare to see that there are other elements that contribute to the strength or weakness of Indonesia's influence in international politics. Pundits as well as scholars rely on materialist approach in analyzing Indonesia's prospects of becoming a world power. There have been no studies that have tried to look at the non-material elements. Therefore, this study would like to offer an alternative perspective by focusing on non-material analysis that contributes to strengthening Indonesia's role and influence in international politics.

This paper will answer the question: "how is Indonesia's strategy to become an influential global power in international politics by 2045?" There is a considerable amount of literature that examines the strategy of countries to become influential global powers. Most of them examine rising power countries whose foreign policies tend to be very active at the global level and challenge Western hegemony. These countries have ambitions to become a rising power not because they are materially profitable but are recognized as important world powers. This recognition is closely related to the search for status because status reflects how a country occupies a privileged position in the international political arena ([24];[20]). Countries compete for international recognition for what they have done. The country's ambition to gain status as a rising power, for example, is influenced by various factors. But the most important is how the role of ideas in encouraging foreign policy activism [21]. Meanwhile, other experts highlight the role of material factors, especially economics, behind the increasing influence of the state in international sphere ([39]; [18]; [23]; [34]; [35]).

Although the literature on the rising power phenomenon has been widely studied, Indonesia is rarely used as a case study. The majority highlighted China, Russia, India and Brazil. There is a number of literatures dealing specifically with Indonesia as an important world power, all of which focus on Indonesia's foreign policy in the era of the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) administration ([27]; [1]; [31]; [28]; [29]; [15]; [32]; [30]). From the description of a number of these literatures, no one has explicitly discussed Indonesia's strategy to become a global power in the 21st century. Although some of the aforementioned works discuss the character of middle power diplomacy, the discussion tends to be unfocused so that there is no insight on how to actualize middle power diplomacy to encourage Indonesia to increase its influence in the international arena. This research will fill that gap.

This paper argues that Indonesia's strategy to become an influential global power in international politics by 2045 can be pursued by actualizing Indonesia's leadership role as a middle power or "middlepowermanship." This leadership role demands a fairly high level of active participation from Indonesia in multilateral fora. The more active Indonesia is in solving global problems, the more recognized Indonesia's international reputation will be, which in turn will create a "manager of crisis" label that can increase international confidence in Indonesia. However, this does not mean that Indonesia needs to change its status to become a major power; being a developed country does not mean abandoning its traditional status as a middle power. Thus, this book argues that Indonesia must maintain its status as a middle power but needs to increase its influence at the international level.

2 Research Method

In order to answer the question of how Indonesia's strategy to become an influential global power in international politics by 2045, this paper employs the concept of middle power diplomacy. Middle power diplomacy is a concept to describe the foreign policy character of middle power countries. In international relations literature, states are generally categorized into three groups; great or major power, middle power, and small power. Middle power status was unique in that it was halfway between a large country and a small country. Holbraad defined

middle powers as countries that their material capabilities as well as their global responsibility and influence are close to being great powers [13]. This definition of middle power is unclear. Holbraad did not systematically describe the characteristics of the intermediate powers. The review is dominated by empirical facts based on historical experience, similar to Hans Morgenthau's classic realist work, *Politics Among Nations*, which is full of history. Furthermore, he cited the opinion of other experts who define middle powers based on their scope of influence. The middle power, therefore, is the state that plays a role in the regional sphere [13].

A more comprehensive definition of middle power is put forward by Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal in their book *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in Changing World Order*. They defined middle power based on four categories. First, in terms of *position* in the international political hierarchy. Middle powers are countries that occupy a "middle" position in terms of material capabilities; geography, demography, economy, military, and other visible elements. Second, in terms of its *geographical* location, the middle powers are caught in the middle of the rivalry between the two world's great powers. Third, in terms of the *normative* aspect, the middle powers are countries that are "wiser" than large and small countries [6]. Therefore, the middle powers tend to be more trusted in diplomatic affairs because there is no pretension to use the means of violence. Fourth, in terms of *foreign policy* behavior. The typical style of middle power foreign policy is often known as "middlepowermanship" which is characterized by a tendency to use multilateral means to resolve international problems, choose a compromise route to international disputes and conflicts, and is based on the motive of being a "good international citizen" [6]. Cooper et al. divide middle power diplomacy into three roles. First, the role as a *catalyst* is to initiate or lead international cooperations. Second, the role of *facilitator* is to focus on agenda-setting in various international forums. This role includes planning, convening, and hosting of meeting in order to achieve international agreements. Third, the role as a *manager* that focuses on institution-building. This role requires the state to build trust among countries and to facilitate conflict resolution [6].

Middle power is often associated with the growth and development of international organizations. This is because in contrast to large countries that use international organizations as instruments of national interest, or small countries that do not have a significant role in them, the interest of middle power countries is to ensure the effective operation of international organizations. This is not to say that the middle powers are driven by certain ideological motives but are committed to creating international order. In addition, the middle powers also have a foreign policy character that tends to be in the middle, especially in international conflicts. Cox states that middle power plays a role as an actor who seek common perspective and reduce risk in the management of conflict [7].

One of the important concepts in the middle power diplomacy is "niche diplomacy." In simple terms, this concept refers to the tendency of middle power foreign policy to focus on one area of international issues. Gareth Evans defines niche diplomacy as a foreign policy that is concentrating on a single issue are that a country good at [8]. In other words, focusing on the areas that are most controlled will increase the chances of the country's diplomatic success rather than taking over everything. Western society has an adage about this principle, namely "Jack of all trades, master of none" (good at everything, but can't be an expert in it). This topic of niche diplomacy is discussed at length by Andrew Cooper in the book he edited entitled *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After Cold War*. In the midst of a dynamic and unpredictable international geopolitical situation, the concept of niche diplomacy is defined as "the ability of individual countries, like biological species or firms, to identify and fill niche space on a selective basis through policy ingenuity and execution" [5]. Cooper gave an example of how Canada and Australia play a special role in their issue-specific areas in international organizations. This practice of niche diplomacy will provide a double advantage; symbolic and instrumental. Symbolically, the status of the country will increase along with its active contribution in international organizations. Instrumentally, this model of diplomacy allows the state to play a more constructive role than big countries [5].

The study of middle power diplomacy then distinguishes between "traditional middle power" and "emerging middle power" [14]. This distinction arises because the literature on middle power diplomacy focuses on Western liberal democracies. This is different from the emerging middle powers, which mostly come from ex-Western colonial countries where the consolidation of democracy is still ongoing, some of which may even be stumbling. In terms of the historical context of its emergence, traditional middle power has emerged in the Cold War era while emerging middle power has only emerged after the end of the Cold War. Then in terms of economic capacity, traditional middle power is an egalitarian developed country with a high level of prosperity. This is clearly different from emerging middle power originating from developing countries where the economy is still far from prosperous. This factor is also what makes traditional middle power at the center of the world's capitalistic economic system (core), while emerging middle power belongs to the group of semi-periphery countries. In terms of influence, traditional middle power does not have much influence in the region. This is different from emerging middle power which is relatively more dominant in its role in the region. Lastly, traditional middle power is relatively weaker in spirit than emerging middle power in initiating, participating, or leading regional cooperation [14].

The implications of these differences include the concept of "good international citizens" which is very closely related to traditional middle power because they are countries with strong economies so that there is a kind of altruism regarding humanitarian issues, for example in the form of foreign aid and humanitarian intervention.

Meanwhile, emerging middle powers prefer to be “mediator” or “honest broker” in international conflicts. Economic factors also make differences in foreign policy orientation between the two. Because they are classified as developed countries, traditional middle power tends not to be too concerned about changing the international order. In other words, its foreign policy is status quo or “appeasement.” This contrasts with emerging middle power diplomacy which is more “reformist” because it aims to change the international order [14].

The question remains, that is, where did the middle power diplomacy come from? Or what are the factors that influence a country to practice middle power diplomacy? Karim argues that the state pursues middle power diplomacy because it is driven by the pursuit of status as a “middle power” [15]. Middle power diplomacy is carried out by playing certain roles, for example the case of Indonesia which has a number of role identities such as “peacemaker,” “bridge builder,” “norms setter,” and so on. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between “status as a middle power” and “role as a middle power” where the former refers to the national goals or interests of a country, while the latter refers to policy instruments to achieve that goal. Thus, role conceptions explain states’ foreign policy in the pursuit of the status as middle power [15]. In line with Karim, Thies and Sari also argue that the best identification tool for middle power diplomacy is the role that the state plays in the international sphere; be a “good international citizen,” support multilateralism, and support the international order [38].

3 Result and Discussion

Indonesia’s middlepowermanship in the conflict resolution

By acting as a peacemaker, Indonesia realizes that cooperation with other countries is crucial to achieving the nation’s goals as stated in the opening of the 4th paragraph of the 1945 Constitution. The policy of peace and friendship with all nations on the basis of mutual respect by not interfering with the respective government structures is implemented in the goals of Indonesia’s foreign policy. World peace is believed by Indonesia as a policy based on reality. This is because of the rational nature of human beings that tend to make positive choices, such as good over evil and peace over war, as evidenced by the invention of war weapons that are increasingly frightening and destructive [3].

The principle of Indonesia’s foreign policy, namely being free and active, does not merely indicate that Indonesia’s policy is a neutral policy of the two opposing blocs, namely the West block and the East block. Indonesia’s membership in the United Nations (UN) makes Indonesia unable to remain neutral as a commitment of international solidarity to international events, especially in the event of war, in accordance with articles 41 and 43 of the UN charter. The active principle means that Indonesia strives to work vigorously to maintain peace and relieve tensions caused by the Western and Eastern blocs through various efforts supported by the majority of UN members. Indonesia’s political relations with other countries on the basis of mutual respect over differences are the main factors in Indonesia’s approach to international relations.

The existence of international cooperation through Indonesia’s relations with foreign countries can participate in realizing the ideals of the Indonesian people, namely peace and prosperity. In this case, prosperity can be realized through international cooperation created through Indonesia’s foreign policy. Pancasila is one of the factors that shape Indonesia’s foreign policy. These five basic postulates that become national philosophy also serve as guidelines in policy making [3].

During the Soekarno administration, the Ali Cabinet carried out a new study by taking the initiative in diplomatic efforts based on an active foundation in Indonesian foreign policy. The foreign policy opportunities of the active Ali Cabinet were discovered through the conflicting Sino-American relations. The existence of this conflict led to the inaugural Colombo Powers meeting which was attended by the prime ministers of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Indonesia to bring about peace in Geneva, provide a peaceful solution in the Indochina region, and provide a settlement of cold war negotiations in Asia. In the Colombo Powers meeting, Indonesia played a significant role through Ali Sastroamidjojo by proposing the holding of the Asia-Africa Summit. This conference aims to contribute to the relaxation of cold war tensions on two continents (Asia and Africa), as well as a meeting point to continue the struggle of Asians and Africans against colonialism. The Asia-Africa Summit proposed by prime minister Ali was approved by the prime ministers who are members of Colombo Powers, and the conference was attended by 29 countries which was held in Bandung, Indonesia. The Asia-Africa Summit was a major victory for the Ali Cabinet. This is because the conference was successful in building and showing a sense of unity and solidarity among the leaders of the world that was once colonized. Indonesia achieved two diplomatic victories during the Asia-Africa Summit, that is, the signing of a dual citizenship agreement and affirmation of support for the West Irian claim [9]. Thus, the foreign policy of the Ali cabinet is very strong in realizing peace by promoting a combination of diplomatic professionalism and symbols of anti-colonialism.

The conflict in the Middle East, namely the Suez Crisis, prompted Indonesia to form a Garuda Troop. The conflict was a joint attack by France, Israel and Britain against Egypt. In the forum of the League of Nations, Egypt became the first country to de jure recognize Indonesia’s independence, besides that Egypt participated in helping Indonesia persistently support Indonesia in the conflict dispute with the Netherlands. This prompted Soekarno to return the favor by helping to defuse the Suez Crisis through the sending of peacekeepers under the United Nations

in 1957. The Garuda troops or peacekeeping troops were referred to as the Garuda Contingent (KONGA). During his reign, Soekarno sent three Garuda contingents to various conflict areas. The Garuda I contingent was sent to Egypt on January 8, 1957. The Garuda Contingent was then divided into two, one of which was sent to Gaza. The Garuda I contingent carried out its duties until September 29, 1957. Subsequently, the Garuda II contingent was sent to the Congo from September 1960 to May 1961. The Garuda III contingent became the last Garuda contingent to be sent under the leadership of Soekarno. This contingent was sent to Congo under UNOC from 1962 to late 1963.

The transfer of power from the Old Order to the New Order coincided with a shift in the focus of world politics to the early stages of economic development and improvement after World War II. This shift was highlighted by research by the United Nations which stated that in the 1960s, membership in the United Nations continued to grow and development issues came to the attention of the international community through actions both within and outside the United Nations. In addition to what the UN has done, the countries in the world are mutually improving cooperative and diplomatic relations with countries that are considered mutually beneficial and trying to unite countries that have the same goals and needs to form a forum to accommodate these interests. This era was also marked by massive decolonization in Asia and Africa which influenced the movement of new countries in establishing status in the international arena.

Indonesia under Suharto's leadership carried out a foreign policy with a "non-Islamic" character, namely Islamic solidarity was not the main basis or consideration for Indonesia in shaping foreign policy. Therefore, Indonesia's support for Arab countries towards Israel is based on the principle of justice rather than religious equality. Indonesia's national interest is the main objective in carrying out Indonesia's policy towards the Middle East. The military's fear of Islamic fundamentalism in domestic politics is the main reason for Indonesia's non-Islamic foreign policy. Suharto's decision to mediate the Bosnian-Serbian conflict by sending several peacekeepers to Bosnia under the UN can be seen as a concession to Muslims, although the rhetoric used remains non-Islamic. In addition, Suharto also allowed the PLO to establish an embassy in Jakarta. This is because Suharto had a lot of support from Muslims in his demilitarization plan [36].

In addition to being a mediator for Serbia-Bosnia, Suharto's foreign policy was that Indonesia was involved as a mediator in the Mindanao conflict. Indonesia's role began when President Marcos and Chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front, Nur Misuari, asked Indonesia for help in resolving the conflict. Suharto accepted a request for help, which then Indonesia openly helped the Philippines in overcoming the increasingly complex Mindanao conflict between the Philippine government and the Moro. This was done by Suharto in view of Indonesia's close historical relationship with the Philippines. In easing the existing conflict, Indonesia has established good communication with the Philippine government and Moro in order to bring the two of them towards peace talks. The mediation provided by Indonesia is to provide an alternative solution in the form of special autonomy which is the middle way in the impasse in the negotiations between the two parties. The idea of special autonomy became the main point in the Final Peace Agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro which was signed on September 2, 1996 [17].

Indonesia's foreign policy underwent several important changes after the Soeharto government. The priority of foreign policy in Megawati's era was ASEAN countries which were called the first concentric circle, therefore Megawati focused on policies that prioritized neighbors as her foreign policy. This policy is an internal balancing strategy for Indonesia to strengthen internal consolidation and the rise of ASEAN to fight external pressures [12]. In her foreign policy policy, Megawati sent the Garuda XX Contingent which was divided into two troops, namely the Garuda XX/A Contingent which was sent from September 6, 2003 to September 6, 2004 to Bundo, Congo, and the Garuda XX/B Contingent serving in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Garuda XX contingent was sent by Megawati to maintain world peace in the conflict area.

Indonesia's preference for non-intervention and neutrality shows its involvement in the international community through UN peacekeeping missions. This influenced Indonesia's foreign policy in the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to have a million friends and zero enemies which was manifested by upholding democratic values and human rights. Throughout his reign, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono democratized Indonesia's foreign policy, which was reflected in providing support to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) as well as hosting the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) [25]. The military background of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the Chief Observer of the Indonesian Military at the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia during 1995-1996 was one of the factors in the role of individual catalysts in pushing policies so that the peace mission was carried out by sending Garuda troops to conflict areas. Indonesia's role as a peacemaker is reflected in its behavior towards the crisis in Syria. Indonesia's substantive actions in helping the crisis in Syria have received international attention that Indonesia has the potential as an influential global actor in bringing about peace.

Similar to the previous leader, the Jokowi government has also played a role as a peacemaker in responding to international events. The peace mission carried out by Indonesia is realized through sending Garuda contingents to the territory of other countries. The Garuda XXXIX-A contingent and the Garuda XXXIX-K contingent carried out peace missions to Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Indonesia during the Jokowi

administration sent a special envoy to ease tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2016. Good relations between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia and Iran encouraged Indonesia to be involved in resolving the conflict peacefully with the aim that existing tensions would not have a big impact to surrounding countries. Indonesia under Jokowi's leadership decided to mediate the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran because it was based on the support and encouragement of a domestic organization, namely the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). The OIC Conference was held by the MUI with the aim of increasing solidarity between countries in conflict. In addition, this conference was held as a forum for formulating Indonesia's foreign policy based on the national constitution, namely the Law of the Republic of Indonesia. Basically, Indonesia as a mediator of the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is carried out on the basis of Indonesia's national interests. This interest is an interest in the social aspect, namely to protect Indonesian citizens residing in the Middle East Region, as well as trade interests that lead to the economic aspect.

Indonesia's middlepowermanship in multilateralism

Multilateralism is an inseparable concept of middle power diplomacy. This is because the axis of multilateralism revolves around new issues that are not adequately addressed by existing structures. At the same time, the middle powers have a significant role in restoring the vitality and relevance of the international order. Activities on multilateral issues have been widely carried out by the middle powers today, such as the rise of the G20 as a leading forum for discussing the global economy, negotiations and ratification of the NEW START conducted by the United States and Russia, the intervention of the UN security council in Libya under R2P, and so forth. The G20 is one of the forums that provides a forum for middle powers to contribute to the handling of new unresolved issues. Through the G20, middle power countries can participate in providing aspirations, especially in international economic issues.

Multilateral cooperation is needed by countries because there are many certain issues that currently tend to be ignored and not handled adequately in the existing international order. This is caused by several factors. First, problems on certain issues are difficult to resolve at the interstate level. Second, there are differences in the scope and depth of multilateral challenges between issues. For example, regarding the issue of food security and climate that has a global scope by involving most of the states. The complexity of the issue is increasing due to the number of state actors and non-state actors involved which hinders effective multilateralism. Third, many studies of the international order reveal that it is easier to build on existing treaties or structures than a new international order. International institutions that were formed later after the establishment of institutions, such as the United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and NATO, are few and far between. Examples are the WTO and the NPT. However, nowadays it is realized that the formation of new institutions is needed to overcome new issues such as cyber warfare, drone warfare, to climate change.

Middle powers, such as Indonesia, Australia, Korea, Turkey, and Mexico, have a crucial role in advancing ideas and contributing to the axis of multilateralism in their own ways so that the five countries tend not to take coordinated action. Indonesia is the largest middle power by far. On a regional scale, Indonesia's role as a middle power can be seen in the rise of China. The main objective of Indonesia's foreign policy is to assist the regional order in order to prevent the occurrence of a cold war between China and the United States which put pressure on Indonesia and other countries. Indonesia as a middle power has a strategy called dynamic balance with the aim of building a series of regional mechanisms that are driven by the middle powers. The focus in Indonesia's efforts is on strengthening regional architecture and resolving existing disputes, for example Indonesia as a key mediator in the South China Sea dispute. In the global scope, Indonesia contributes to strengthening the international order by being part of the G20 as well. In addition, Indonesia seeks to address poverty in the 2013 APEC Summit forum where Indonesia is the host of the forum.

Indonesia as an independent country on August 17, 1945 was faced with a situation where the independence that had been achieved did not prevent the Dutch government from carrying out aggression and other threats to sovereignty. Therefore, Indonesia practiced diplomacy in defending its independence. The practice of diplomacy was carried out with the aim that Indonesia's independence was recognized by the international community, especially during the Syahrir Cabinet. This was done by Indonesia by attending the UN Security Council session on August 14, 1947 at Lake Success. Sutan Syahrir as the representative of Indonesia in the UN session gave a speech that will determine the fate of Indonesia in the international world. With the diplomacy carried out by Indonesia, the United Nations participated in assisting Indonesia in maintaining its independence by establishing the Three Nations Commission as a mediator in the Indonesian-Dutch conflict. The Three Nations Commission which was formed facilitated the Roem-Royen Agreement to stop the Dutch ceasefire against Indonesia. The assistance provided by the United Nations shows Indonesia's success in carrying out its diplomacy.

The era of guided democracy took place after the Indonesian parliamentary democracy led by Sukarno. In this era, Soekarno persistently introduced Indonesia to the international world so that Indonesia would gain recognition of its existence in the international sphere, as well as form an anti-imperialist and Western colonialism alliance in carrying out foreign policy. This is reflected in Indonesia's attitude in the global scope to echo the countries in the world, especially Asia and Africa, to be neutral and impartial between the Western and Eastern blocs in the

Cold War. In addition, Indonesia also supports Asian and African countries to gain independence. Both of Indonesia's actions were carried out through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Asian-African Conference (KAA). The KAA was organized by the Ali Sastroamidjojo I Cabinet as a part of Indonesia's foreign policy. The Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung in 1955 and was attended by 29 Asian and African countries with the aim of creating a relationship of solidarity between these countries.

Indonesia plays a significant role in its regional scope. Indonesia is the country that pioneered the formation of ASEAN on August 8, 1967, along with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. ASEAN was formed after the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation. The signing of the ASEAN declaration was carried out by the foreign ministers of the five pioneer countries of which Adam Malik was the representative of Indonesia. The discussion to form a regional cooperation organization within the scope of Southeast Asia had previously been carried out by Indonesia and Thailand during the peace discussion in dealing with the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia in Bangkok.

Indonesia actively contributed in overcoming international issues in various world forums during the Soeharto era, such as OIC and OPEC. OIC is the Organization of the Islamic Conference which focuses on increasing the existence of Islamic cooperation among member countries. Indonesia joined the OIC in 1969 and served as chairman of the OIC Peace Committee for the Southern Philippines or known as the OIC PCSP which aims to promote peace in the Southern Philippines. Meanwhile, Indonesia joined OPEC in 1962. OPEC is an organization of oil exporting countries. Indonesia plays a major role in OPEC through Indonesian representatives, Prof. Dr. Subroto, as Executive Director of OPEC in 1984-1985 and 1988-1994. Indonesia has succeeded in becoming a mediator to mediate the gap between Arab, African and Latin American countries. In addition, Indonesia is a key player in the relationship between OPEC and the International Energy Agency (IEA). Indonesia's role in OPEC is also seen in encouraging the establishment of the International Energy Forum (IEF) which aims to discuss and discuss challenges and opportunities in the oil industry.

During Megawati's reign, Indonesia focused on domestic stability with reference to the importance of foreign policy. The importance of ASEAN and the ASEAN trade area was the only discussion on foreign policy in Megawati's first state of the nation speech on August 16, 2001. Based on her speech, Megawati explained that ASEAN countries were the first concentric circle in Indonesia's foreign policy priorities. Indonesia's foreign policy that prioritizes ASEAN countries is an internal balancing strategy with the aim of resurrecting ASEAN and strengthening internal consolidation to counter pressures that come from outside. Indonesia has a big role in ASEAN with a pro-active commitment in building the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), ASEAN Economic Community (MEA), and ASEAN Security Community (ASC) at the signing of the Bali Concord II at the 2003 ASEAN Summit Indonesia is a key actor in international relations in the Southeast Asia Region, which is strengthened by the Bali Concord II.

Indonesia as a middle power showed a high commitment to multilateralism during the reign of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). In the regional scope within ASEAN, Indonesia's commitment can be seen in its role in initiating the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights (AICHR). Indonesia is the prime mover behind the ASEAN Charter with the aim of strengthening liberal norms in ASEAN. Indonesia's role is to encourage the existence of an agency to address regional human rights issues in the ASEAN region as a guideline to promote and protect human rights. SBY's leadership has further strengthened Indonesia's identity as a democratic country. SBY's foreign policy is a form of strong commitment from the merger between democracy and diplomacy. Diplomatic approach is taken by Indonesia in promoting democracy. This effort was seen in the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) in 2008. This forum was conducted as a forum to bridge between democracy and autocracy. In addition, SBY's leadership focuses on climate protection as one of the main focuses of his policies. This has led Indonesia to host various international conferences, one of which was the 13th World Climate Conference in Bali in 2007 which resulted in the Bali Action Plan. The success of the commitment to multilateralism in the SBY era was evidenced by the response that this conference was the best conference during the COP (Conference of the Parties) because the Bali Action Plan was ratified by all countries as a mechanism for reducing greenhouse gas emissions on a global scale.

4 Conclusion

As a middle power, Indonesia has a great opportunity to become a 21st century global power that relies not only on material capabilities (military and economic) but also on the implementation of effective diplomacy. Having material capabilities alone is not enough to support a country's diplomatic posture. The key to increasing influence in the international world is to increase the effectiveness of diplomacy. Therefore, Indonesia needs to improve the diplomatic performance of its middle powers in order to be able to generate bargaining power when dealing with other countries. This paper has analyzed the two pillars of Indonesia's middle power diplomacy, namely a commitment to conflict resolution and a commitment to multilateralism. Both are indicators of middle power diplomacy. Indonesia has long implemented these two diplomacies. However, in the future, commitment to these two roles, namely as a peacemaker and a global multilateralist, must continue to be increased. This in turn will

contribute to improving Indonesia's global reputation so that the international community deserves to hand over global responsibility to Indonesia. This means that Indonesia is believed to be "a responsible stakeholder."

This research is expected to provide a double contribution, both in terms of academic and practical. From an academic point of view, this research is expected to enrich alternative perspectives on state strategies to become influential actors in the international environment. The majority of traditional analyzes of this issue are still dominated by the realist point of view which emphasizes the material dimension (economic and military). However, many analyzes from non-material perspectives have been carried out but do not get a proper place among International Relations (IR) academics. Therefore, this research tries to "mainstream" this alternative perspective.

From a practical point of view, this research is expected to offer policy recommendations regarding the strategy to make Indonesia an influential global power in 2045. As a middle power country, Indonesia's current role is actually quite taken into account in the international political arena. Ironically, Indonesia's voice is not heard much, for example in setting the agenda or directing international opinion and policy. Although Indonesia has strong material (economic and military) capabilities, increasing international influence requires a different strategy. This research will try to provide policy suggestions regarding this matter.

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